

Anglican Theological Review



EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT and BURTON S. EASTON

In Collaboration with Representative Scholars
throughout the Church

Founded by SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

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NUMBER 2

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CONTRASTED PHILOSOPHIES OF CHRISTIANITY

By CHARLES LEMUEL DIBBLE, Kalamazoo

We are told that when Moses was keeping the flock of Jethro in the wilderness he saw, one day, a bush which burned but was not consumed. Curious, he turned aside to see this wonder; but as he approached the Lord spoke to him out of the bush and said, "Put thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy." And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God.

There are present in this simple story all the elements which, as shown by Rudolph Otto,¹ are contained in the primitive idea of the Holy, or as he phrases it 'the Numinous.' There is first a feeling of awe-ful mystery; of something that is not only unusual but uncanny; of something that we not only do not understand but that we feel we are not meant to understand. In modern times, since the idea of causation has become part of our mental background, the Holy is felt to be somehow outside and above the chain of physical causes. This distinction did not, of course, present itself to the primitive mind. Nevertheless, there has been from the first the feeling that the Holy was something "wholly other" from ordinary experience.

¹ In *The Idea of the Holy*.

The second element in the idea of the Holy is the awakening in the beholder of a sense of dread, of something that is more than fear, and that is always accompanied by a realization of unworthiness. To this is joined a haunting fascination, a desire to press closer. Like the moth before the flame we are drawn toward the Unknowable; we must approach It, though for our presumption we should die. Finally, it is to be observed, the sense of the Numinous is by no means purely subjective, but attaches to certain particular places or events.

This idea of the Holy, this sense of religious awe, is universal and is common to all religions; indeed it seems to be the central fact of the religious consciousness upon its emotional side. That is not to say that the emotional side of religion is the whole story. For religion takes hold of the whole man—body, mind and heart—and includes willing and thinking as well as feeling. As to which of these three elements was first in time, let anthropologists and historians and psychologists debate. The fact remains that they are all present in any religion that has so far been discovered. In the presence of the Unknowable, the *Mysterium Tremendum*, man is irresistibly drawn to establish relation with It, and this mysterious urge expresses itself in ritual acts and in rules of conduct. But man not only strives to obey but to understand; he must know why the voice within whispers, "Thou ought." The nature of the Unknowable, then, and His relation to man and to the universe in which man finds himself, the relation in short between the natural and the supernatural, is the primary question for the philosophy of religion. The problem of the relation of the divine to the physical is perhaps no nearer final solution today than it was when our British ancestors placed the mighty rocks of Stonehenge. There are within present day Christianity at least three fundamentally different solutions of the problem; and to understand and contrast them we must trace their antecedents—not perhaps from Stonehenge—but at any rate through Christian history.

I. HEBRAISM AND PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY

The Hebrew religion, in common with all faiths, invested certain places and persons with the particular presence of the Deity. The Temple, the Ark of the Covenant, the King and the Priesthood were regarded as set apart for God. Certain other persons or things were accursed, or God-forsaken.² The Hebrew nation as a whole, while it cherished no pretensions to ethical perfection, felt itself to be holy, or invested with a divine mission. In the later prophets and in the Jewish apocalyptic literature, especially in the Book of Enoch, the Holiness that inhered in the nation came to be focused in one individual, the expected Messiah, human yet unearthly, the vicegerent of God, who should usher in the Great Day of the Lord, when the whole earth should be purged and the wicked should burn as in an oven and Jehovah should establish His reign upon a regenerated earth. The common name for this Messiah was, as in Daniel, One like unto the Son of Man, or, more briefly, the Son of Man, or the Man.³

Such, there can be little doubt, was Jesus' own conception of His mission. His assumption of the title Son of Man, and His constant insistence on the near approach of the Day of the Lord, His constant warning to be ready for the Kingdom of God, are embedded in the earliest record that we have of His words and works, the Gospel according to Saint Mark. They cannot be explained as later accretions without a *tour de force* that would undermine belief in the accuracy of any portion of the synoptic gospels. Furthermore, the tendency of Christian thought, as we find it in the Epistles, the later synoptic gospels, and the Gospel according to Saint John, was away from, rather than toward, this eschatological conception of the Messiah.

² See Joshua 5 : 13-15 and 6 : 16-19.

³ There were many opinions as to the Last Things held in first century Judaism—some did not include the idea of a Messiah, others made him a purely earthly deliverer. But it seems to be the consensus of modern scholars that the opinions held by the early disciples are as I have stated. (See Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus and Saint Paul and His Interpreters*; H. L. Jackson, *The Eschatology of Jesus*; A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The New Testament Doctrine of Christ*.)

The chief concern of our Lord, however, was not to convince men of His Messiahship—that could be left for God to proclaim in His own good time, when He should be seen “sitting at the right hand of Power (*i.e.* God), and coming with the clouds of heaven.” Neither was He concerned to persuade the Jews that the Kingdom of Heaven would one day come. His passionate desire was to prepare the nation so that it might abide the day of His coming. Indeed, for that purpose He seems to have felt it necessary that His Messiahship should be a secret imparted only to the inner circle of believers.

Whatever may have been in the mind of our Lord, there can be no question that His disciples were convinced of His Messiahship, and there is abundant evidence of the awe with which during His earthly lifetime He was regarded. Whatever doubts may have existed in the minds of the disciples were dispelled by the Resurrection, whereby, as Saint Paul puts it, He was demonstrated to be the Son of God with authority. Whereas, during His lifetime, Jesus had been regarded by His disciples as the Anointed of God, He now came more and more to be regarded as Holy, so to speak, in His own right. The former things had been done away, the Messianic kingdom was already begun.

From all this it necessarily followed that the attribute of Holiness was transferred from Jewish institutions to the Christian institutions—or rather, in the thought of the Christians, to the Messianic institutions,—that had now been ushered in, and of which the Jewish were conceived to be the anti-types. The holiness of the Hebrew nation was transferred to the Christian Church. The purgation of fire or of water which the prophets and apocalyptic writers had described as necessary for entrance into the Messianic kingdom, became Christian baptism. The Messianic feast described in the book of Enoch became the Christian Eucharist.⁴ The Hebrew priest-

⁴ Not that the Eucharist was constructed upon the idea of the Messianic feast. Beyond doubt it originated in the Last Supper in the upper room. But it became identified with the prophecy of the Messianic feast and invested with that character in the minds of the disciples.

hood became the Christian priesthood. Within an incredibly short space of time the transition was accomplished; by the time that Saint Paul began to write his letters, and long before the Gospels in their present form were written, the process was practically complete. The history of the first fifty years of Christianity fails utterly to make sense except against the background of Jewish Messianism.

This primitive Christian theology was not, as is often contended, the creation of Saint Paul. No man could have taken the figure of a mere rabbinical teacher and turned him into a god. No man, much less a recent and more or less distrusted convert, could have foisted upon the Christian community a conception wholly alien to its former belief. For what did Stephen die, and the other martyrs who sealed their faith with their blood, while Saul was, as he himself says, yet in his sins? No, Paul did not create the Christian theology; he, with others who shared his opinion, universalized it. At their hands the conception of the Messianic Kingdom ceased to be merely Jewish and became world-wide.

We often hear it said that Christianity is no longer the religion *of* Jesus, but the religion *about* Jesus, and that it should get back to its primitive significance, which is held to be merely a system of ethics. In truth Christianity has always been both the religion of Jesus and the religion about Jesus. Even in its times of debasement the ethical element has been recognized. But the life of Christianity has always centered in its belief in a Risen Lord and Saviour, who had brought to mankind Eternal Life and redeemed His people from their sins. This was true from the very first. Peter and John did not heal the lame man at the temple gate in the name of the Golden Rule. Saint Stephen did not die for a system of ethics. Indeed, the religion of Jesus has been most faithfully practiced by precisely those in whom the religion *about* Jesus has been most firmly held—not as an abstract formula, but as assured reliance upon the power of a Divine Person. If Christianity were to revert to first principles it

might become a Jewish apocalyptic cult; it could never become an ethical culture society.

When Christianity emerges from the obscurity of the first century into the comparative clarity of the second, we see it already developed into the Catholic system in substantially the form that it has since retained, albeit with its theology as yet undeveloped. In Christianity, as in all religions, religious feeling and cultus and organization came first, and last of all the complete system of theology. So we find the Great Church invested, as I have said, with the numinous quality that had belonged to the Hebrew Nation; we find a Bible regarded as the inspired word of God; we find a priesthood regarded, like the Jewish priesthood, as the mouthpiece of God, and we find at least four sacraments, Baptism, the Eucharist, Unction, and Holy Orders, as especial acts whereby in some peculiar sense the grace of God was bestowed upon, or mediated to, the believers.

2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDIÆVAL CHRISTENDOM— CATHOLICISM

As for theology, the early Jewish Christians accepted as the result of their own religious experience the fact of a Christ, who was both human and divine, and the fact of a Holy Spirit, of whose operations they had had most striking evidence. They grafted these concepts upon the Jewish monotheistic concept, which they held as a truism. That the nature of Christ was bipartite and the concept of deity tripartite was naïvely recognized; but they made no effort to solve the problems involved.

With the Greeks it was different. In the Greek climate intellectual and not practical questions came first. Therefore, as soon as Christianity impinged upon Hellenism the Catholic philosophy began to develop. There is no more fascinating study than the history of this fluid period of Christian dogma—so like our own. How Persian and other eastern philosophies, syncretized with Neo-Platonism, strove

for acceptance through the various forms of Gnosticism. How the Great Church finally turned from these; how in turn the purer Platonic tradition was brought to bear through Origen and Clement of Alexandria, until its baptism into Christian dogma in the fourth and fifth centuries; how, later, Aristotle came into view in Western Europe with the rebirth of intellectual life after the Crusades; how another fluid period resulted finally in the acceptance of the Scholastic philosophy;—all this must be passed over at a glance.

Suffice it to say that Catholic philosophy just prior to the Reformation recognized a dualism, or rather many dualisms, in the universe. God and the Devil, the Kingdom of Grace (that is to say the field of unconditioned divine activity) and the Kingdom of Nature (that is the realm of unconditioned natural law), and in man body and spirit,—these dualisms were held to be not only ultimate but mutually exclusive. In the course of events one or the other of these elements supervened, but they never interacted. On the palette of Mediæval thought there were only blacks and whites, never grays. Phenomena were either wholly in accord with Natural Law (spelled with capital letters), or wholly supernatural. Human conduct was either God-inspired or devilish.

Mediæval Catholic philosophy recognized several fields of divine activity. It recognized inspiration, which it held to be a taking possession of the soul by the Holy Spirit, so that the human element became automatic. One of the fruits of inspiration was the Scriptures—in the writing of which, though the pen was held by human fingers, the words were the words of God. It also recognized miracles, which it regarded as wholly supernatural, and in which no natural causes participated. These divine acts were not confined to by-gone ages. It held that they were continually occurring and that the Church was the field in which, and the agency through which, they occurred. It recognized the Church as inspired by God, as indeed the extension of the Incarnation; and being inspired, they held it to be inerrant. Inspiration,

visions, and miracles were occasional. The ordinary and usual manifestation of the divine was in the sacraments. These, likewise, were held to be purely supernatural. To be sure there was in each case a material means or instrument; but Catholic thought tended to minimize this element. To be sure the effectiveness of the sacrament for the individual participant was dependent upon proper reception; but the essential nature of the sacrament was not in any way dependent upon this.

3. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REFORMATION— FUNDAMENTALISM

The Reformation was primarily a revolt against the corruption of the clergy, the commercialization of the offices of the Church, the social injustice of the great ecclesiastical landlords, and the political intrigues of the Papacy. Only as an afterthought were intellectual questions involved. When, however, the break with Rome had become complete, and the insurgents had grouped themselves into rival bodies, it was necessary to justify their position intellectually. This involved the repudiation of the visible Church as a divine organism; and the reformers held that the Church was the invisible body of believers. With this went necessarily a denial of the supernatural character of the acts performed by or through the visible Church, namely ecclesiastical miracles and sacraments. The reformers, however, still thought in blacks and whites. Rome became the devil's church, the Mass became black magic. The field of the supernatural was limited to the Bible, biblical miracles, occasional visions, and certain untoward events that were still regarded as divine visitations, or "acts of God." These alone retained that special quality that we have called numinous; but just because the field of the Numinous had been restricted, the intensity of the feeling was enhanced. The fundamentalists of today are the true children of the Reformation.

4. GROWTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT—DEISM

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a rapid development in the knowledge of natural phenomena. The earth gave up its place as the center of the universe. Storms and droughts were "naturally" explained; plagues and diseases were related to bodily conditions and were no longer regarded as "acts of God." Even the accounts of miracles in the Bible began to be denied or rationalized.

Holding, as they did, a departmentalized conception of the divine and human, the theologians were obliged to retire first from one field and then from another. In consequence the eighteenth century saw a new philosophy of Christianity called Deism. In this view God created the universe and gave it a scheme of natural law, then set it loose to run until it should run down, precisely as a clockmaker would make and wind a watch. In this scheme God did not interfere. Now, Deism, in its extreme statement, was never accepted by any body of Christians; nevertheless all Protestant theologians were in varying degrees affected by it—and much Roman Catholic thinking as well. Their point of view was the same, they only differed in the extent to which they permitted the Deity more or less arbitrary interference with the working of his clock.

Time rolled on. In the nineteenth century the nebular hypothesis and the theory of evolution seemed to eliminate any last possibilities of interference by the Deity with the course of nature. Archæology, astronomy, and biology cast discredit upon the biblical narratives. The field of the Numinous was entirely eliminated. Religion had become ethics tinged with emotion—and the emotion was a very pale pink. Now the behavioristic psychology threatens to wash out the emotion—nay more, to abolish ethics itself. It would seem that religion has at last been superseded. No wonder that the Fundamentalists in alarm have sought to repeal the law of evolution.

5. THE MODERNIST PHILOSOPHY

Yet religion, in spite of mishandling by friend and foe, is not dead. Driven out of the field of sensual phenomena, it has in these latter days developed a philosophy which should be beyond the reach of science—a philosophy to which has been given the name of Modernism. According to this philosophy God is always, everywhere, and equally present. Everything that happens is directly dependent upon the divine will; but since that will is constant, things behave with an unfailing sequence that we call Natural Law. We inherently demand, in our scheme of things, order, justice, mercy, and love, and we will not rest content with a final explanation of the universe in which these are flouted. The existence of these qualities presupposes a god; or, as some would put it, the sum of these qualities *is* God. Natural law will explain all phenomena; some of the events called miracles may have occurred, but if so they merely happened in virtue of some natural law not understood.

The corollary to this philosophy is the "value" theology of Ritschl, which is now coming to be widely accepted. According to this theology the truth *for us*, of any fact, is its *value*. It matters not whether Christ lived or not, the truth for us is the value of the ideal Christ portrayed in the Gospels and developed by Christian thought. The soul of man is like a cask floating upon the sea of the divine. One has but to open a vent and the divine influence flows in. Prayer is opening the vent. It has no influence except within the soul who prays. The effect of prayer seems to be dependent upon belief in a Supreme Being, but the value and effect of such a belief is quite independent of the objective existence of such a Being, nor is the effect of prayer due to any specific activity of God, in answer to the prayer. Worship and sacraments are effective if and as they produce within the soul a sense of the divine presence. Religion thus becomes purely subjective.

The Modernist philosophy has much to be said for it. Religion is once and for all lifted out of the sands of the

material universe and placed high and dry where the tide of scientific knowledge can never reach it. The existence of God can never be disproved and the value of the God idea is forever conserved. The religious life can go on undisturbed by problems of science or history. The theory has also the advantage of simplicity. The old dualities are done away with; the universe can be explained as a monism. All the complicated theories of sin and redemption, all the cumbrous machinery of Church and creed and sacrament are avoided. The religious life is simply a matter of being in tune with the Infinite.

The first objection to the Modernist philosophy is that it is *too* simple. Says Prof. Whitehead in his *Religion in the Making*, "As a rebound from dogmatic intolerance the simplicity of religious truth has been a favorite axiom of liberalizing theologians. It is difficult to understand upon what evidence this notion is based. In the physical world, as science advances, we discern a complexity of interrelations. There is a certain simplicity of dominant ideas, but modern physics does not disclose a simple world. To reduce religion to a few simple notions seems an arbitrary solution of the problem before us. It may be common sense; but is it true? . . . All simplifications of religious dogma are shipwrecked upon the rock of the problem of evil."

In the second place, if a God such as the Modernists conceive cannot be disproved, neither can he be proved. If we had no experience of wind or vacuum, we could not imagine air. A God who is equally present and equally active everywhere is unprovable. We need not take him into our calculation. It is related that when Laplace explained his nebular theory to Napoleon, the latter inquired what place this left for God. "God," replied Laplace, "is not needed in my hypothesis."

The invocation of God in prayer, therefore, becomes an idle form. We may quite as well repeat each morning, "Every day in every way I am getting better and better."

The new philosophy finds God everywhere in general and nowhere in particular. All ground is equally holy; man must go emotionally barefoot all the time or not at all. Human nature being what it is, the former is impossible. So men keep on their shoes, and their hats, on all occasions. The essence of the Numinous is that it is felt to be "entirely other" than ordinary experiences; and since nothing is felt to be "entirely other" we are losing the sense of the Numinous altogether.⁵

The "value" theology has a perfect analogy in economic theory. In the 18th century the philosophers observed, and correctly, that the value of money lay in what it would buy and that paper money would do as well as gold so long as it would pass current. Acting on this theory, the French

⁵ Professor J. H. Leuba put his finger upon the difference between Modernism and religion as it has always been understood, in the course of a "debate" in the *Forum* for September, 1927, with the English biologist, Professor J. Arthur Thomson, upon the question, "Are religion and science irreconcilable?" While we cannot agree to Professor Leuba's negative, we must admit that he had a clearer conception of what religion really is than did his opponent.

Says he, "An impressive instance of the usual way of side-stepping the real question between science and religion was recently provided by an array of scientists, educators, and theologians who gave wide publication to a statement due, it is said, mainly to the pen of the eminent physicist, Robert A. Millikan: 'It is a sublime conception of God which is furnished by science, and one wholly consonant with the highest ideals of religion, when it represents him as revealing himself through countless ages in the development of the earth.' A God revealing himself in the development of the earth, as science now understands it, may be consonant with the highest *ideals* of religion, and it is truly not antagonistic to science; but a God so revealed, *and in no other way*, is not the God of the religions as they exist. . . . The religions, as they have been and are now, are not adequately characterized by a particular disposition of the heart and will, or belief in a divine order of *any* sort; but include undeniably, as an essential element, a belief in one or several gods, in personal, intellectual, or emotional relation with man—a belief correlated with a specific method of realizing the religious purpose."

Professor A. S. Eddington (*The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 348-9) likewise regards this type of apologetic as superficial. "A besetting temptation of the scientific apologist for religion is to take some of its current expressions, and after clearing away crudities of thought (which must necessarily be associated with anything adapted to the everyday needs of humanity) to water down the meaning until little is left that could possibly be in opposition to science or to anything else."

government began to issue paper money—a new way had been found to get something for nothing. For a time all went well. Then of a sudden people lost faith in the new currency. It no longer passed current. The value shrank like a snowball in the April sun. Men have learned by bitter experience that money will not for long retain its value without an intrinsic basis. It is exactly so with the “value” theology. A fiat money religion is doomed to collapse.

6. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNIST PHILOSOPHY

In consequence of subjectivism in theology, there has been a striking change in the practical aspect of religious organization and worship. Other-worldliness is at a discount. It is regarded as somewhat disreputable to have a care for the future of your own soul, let alone the souls of your neighbors. The Church ministers to physical needs, concerns itself with correcting social abuses (all these things being good in themselves), plunges into politics,—in short does everything under heaven except the one thing that it alone can do,—heal the sick soul. It offers society a cup of cold water, but not, alas, in the name of a prophet.

The whole idea of the Numinous is going from Protestantism. The sacraments have become memorials. The notion of the Church as in any sense a divine institution, or as different in quality from a Masonic Lodge or a Young Men's Christian Association, is going out. Religion has become secularized. The community church, the logical outcome of the modernist philosophy, is the spiritual home of Mr. Babbitt.

“In public worship,” says J. B. Pratt in *The Religious Consciousness*, “the purpose is to produce an effect, not upon God, but upon the members of the congregation.” The hymns are more and more secular. The prayers are meditations—their mood is the subjunctive, not the precatory imperative. Yet the purpose, to produce a subjective effect upon the congregation, has not succeeded. All sorts of expedients are being tried, beautiful buildings, written prayers,

music, vestments, ceremonial—all to no purpose. "The difficulty with Protestant worship," says he, "goes deeper than the surface, and until some more fundamental change is wrought, its mode of worship will always remain unsatisfactory. The worshiper in the Protestant Church must be made to feel, as the Catholic feels at the Mass, that *something is really being done*—something in addition to the subjective change in his own consciousness."

7. THE PRESENT CRISIS

If the contrasted philosophies of Christianity that are presented to us were merely rival schools of thought, we might leave the decision between them to the cloister and the porch. But unfortunately there are practical consequences to which we cannot shut our eyes. No more superficial platitude was ever voiced than that which we hear so often, that it does not matter what a man thinks, but what he does. For, fortunately, in spite of occasional lapses into emotionalism, man does in the long run act upon his intellectual judgments and beliefs. Habit, and custom, which is racial habit, may cause a lag between belief and practice, may carry over for a time standards of conduct based on beliefs no longer held; but the delay will hardly endure for more than a generation. The older generation has been presented with the alternative of a Catholicism and Fundamentalism that it could not accept and a Modernism that had sold out, and it has renounced both; and the younger generation is proceeding to act upon this renunciation.

The traditional Catholic philosophy, the Modernist, and the Fundamentalist, which is a half-way house between the other two—all these are unsatisfactory. The Catholic and Fundamentalist philosophy is out of step with science and the Modernist philosophy is out of step with religion. The trouble with the Catholic philosophy was that it froze at the Council of Trent and has never thawed out. The trouble with the Modernist philosophy is that it exists only as a highly rarified gas. What we need today is a liquid.

We must somehow, if we are to keep any religion at all, get back the age-old sense of the Numinous that we have almost lost, the belief in a Reality wholly-other to this present world, and in a God who really counts. We must not only believe that God is, but that He is a rewarder of all that put their trust in Him, a God who in some sense withdraws himself from the course of nature and works *ex opere operato* and in particular. We hear much of the Real Presence; what we need is belief in the possibility of a Real Absence. In Catholicism, and there alone, are these beliefs conserved today; and it must be out of that system, if at all, that the reconstruction shall come.⁶

Yet the reconstruction cannot be made as Catholicism, at least in its Roman form, would require that it be made, by abandoning modern thought and returning to traditionalism and obscurantism. *Wir gehen nicht nach Canossa*. We cannot, if we would, set back the hands of the clock to the first century, or the thirteenth, or the sixteenth. We must give full faith and credit to the assured discoveries in every science, although not necessarily to the supposed metaphysical deductions from them,—in geology, anthropology, biology, psychology, Biblical criticism, and all the rest.

More than that, we must adopt in the field of theology the methods of procedure of the scientist. We must regard a dogma as a resumé of the facts of religious experience, which in point of historical fact was precisely the way in which dogmas took shape. We may, and should, give great weight to the judgments of the past; both on account of the great mass of religious experience behind them, and the fact that in

⁶ It is true that the school of Karl Barth is making an effort, a very able effort, to get back the Numinous in terms of the philosophy of the Reformation. This school is exerting a wide influence on German thought. It is doubtful, however, that it will prove ultimately acceptable, for it is tied up to a wooden theory of Inspiration and to the Calvinistic doctrine of Grace and Election; furthermore it does not and cannot come to terms with modern thought, for the reason that Protestantism, unlike Catholicism, is unable to allow for development in religion. English readers may learn of Dr. Barth's theology through one of his books which has been translated under the title, *The Word of God and the Word of Man*.

evaluating this experience the mind of the whole Church was brought to bear and was enlightened, as we believe, by the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, we are not foreclosed from reconsidering those judgments, since they were conditioned by the experience then at hand, and we are bound to believe that the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is progressive. In short, while we cannot agree with Modernism as a philosophy, we should adopt it as a method of procedure.

We must in every case form our beliefs on the facts of religious experience, and not deform the facts to fit our preconceived ideas. This experience must be universal, although not necessarily unanimous. We are not called upon to account for cranks. We must, it is true, re-examine the experience of the past in the light of the added experience of the present. We are in possession of vast information of which the ancients never dreamed; we must bring this also into court; but let us be careful not to overvalue it. Let us remember that it is quite possible that God may have spoken in the past in ways that He does not speak today,—or rather that we do not hear today,—just because our ears are deafened by the roar of machinery, or our eyes blinded by the white light of science.

Religious doctrines, like scientific laws, must not run counter to the whole body of knowledge or to some established fact in another field of research, since truth cannot contradict itself. This does not mean, however, that in every case of apparent antinomy the religious belief should give way. There are plenty of antinomies within the realm of science itself. I am sure that at present theologians are far too ready to go hat in hand to science and beg whatever crumbs may chance to fall. Especially in the field of the psychology of religion theology needs to maintain, as against the mechanists, the veridical value of religious experience and the reality of the free soul to which it bears testimony.

Strangely enough, a whole-hearted acceptance and application of these principles, the procedure insisted upon by

Modernists, leads nowhere else than into the Catholic camp. The Modernist evades this destination only by dogmatic adherence to a preconceived notion, that the universe is a monism and that it is possible to form an equation between the body and soul, between God and electrons—a notion for which there is not the slightest basis other than the human instinct for tidiness. Indeed, the evidence is all the other way. This isn't a tidy universe; and in order to make it seem so the Modernists have been obliged to reject or discount, with a dogmatism every bit as arbitrary as ever was the dogmatism of an inquisitor, full half the evidence.

The religious experience of the whole race testifies that God may be, and has been, approached through material agencies, indeed that He cannot for long be apprehended in any other way; yet the Modernist refuses to recognize this experience as more than subjective, declines to receive it as any evidence of the objective truth of the sacramental theory. Widely separated races and diverse religions recognize and practice sacred meals through which in some sense the Divine is imparted to the worshiper; these the Modernist receives as evidence only of an incorrigible human tendency to superstition. The principle of evolution, the idea that time is not a succession of clock ticks but a process, a growth that we can't reverse if we would, is at the very heart of modern thought. History shows that the Catholicism of the second century and succeeding centuries was a logical, and indeed necessary, evolution from the crude eschatological ideas of the first; all this evolution Modernism waves aside as corruption. Modernism would have us turn back the hands of the clock, which we couldn't do if we would, cancel out all of Christian history since the first century, and get "back to Jesus"—not, however, to Jesus as history shows Him, but to an ideal Jesus that never existed save in the mind of the modern liberal theologian.

When all is said and done, and historians, psychologists, metaphysicians, and theologians have said their say, there

yet remains to Catholicism one very humble virtue—it works. Whilst Modernist divines are filling the periodicals with their complaints of the disease of religion and are suggesting all sorts of remedies, the Catholic system is going on its way, as it has gone for two thousand years. Macauley's traveler has not yet arrived in London; but nothing has happened since Macauley uttered his prophecy to indicate that it may not yet be fulfilled. Surely here is a criterion that is the very shibboleth of modern science, the test of experiment. The Modernist should be the last person in the world to deny that you cannot gather grapes from thorns.

It is the glory and not the shame of historic Christianity that it has embodied so many universal religious beliefs and practices. Some scoffer has said, "The question is not, when did Christianity become Catholic; but when did Catholicism become Christian." I am proud to agree to this. I cannot agree to a theory of Christian history that holds that Christ made a clean break with the past and established for a few short years the ideal religion, and that all subsequent Christian history has been a progressive corruption punctuated with spasmodic and short-lived efforts at reform. If the beliefs and practices which some condemn are so hardy, so impossible to exterminate, they must have tremendous "survival value," and hence on our modern theories of evolution they must be fittest for their environment, the soul of man. Should we keep our soul like a plot of ground from which all the luxuriant growth is mercilessly exterminated? These plants that *will* grow back may need to be trained, may need to be pruned, but they don't need to be pulled up by the roots.

8. RE-EXAMINATION OF CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY

Feeling sure that Catholicism alone will stand the test of modern methods of inquiry and at the same time conserve the sense of the Numinous, that orientation of the soul that we may call other-worldliness, the theologians of the Anglican Church who are sometimes called Neo-Catholics and a growing

group of Protestant thinkers who call themselves Free Catholics have addressed themselves to the task of effecting the proposed synthesis of religious philosophies, on the basis of the Catholic philosophy, with such restatement or modification as will divorce it from Scholasticism, unite it to modern ways of thinking, fit it into our present scheme of the universe, and clothe it in modern language. I propose to trace the lines, as it seems to me, upon which this restatement is proceeding.

Catholic philosophy recognizes a real dualism at the very heart of things. God and Nature, matter and spirit, the soul and the body—these are forever incommensurable. Any monistic theory is shipwrecked, as Mr. Whitehead has said, on the problem of evil. Yet these dualisms are not, as the Scholastics seem to have held, mutually exclusive. They interact constantly; mind moves body and body conditions mind. God acts in time. The Catholic holds that God acts and speaks in particular; while the Modernist holds that God works uniformly, always, and everywhere. The Catholic does not deny the divine immanence, but contends that there are also special modes or manifestations of divine activity. The Modernist holds that in the calculus of human destiny the divine is a constant and the human only is a variable; while the Catholic holds that there are two variables.

These special manifestations of God are:

- a.* Miracles, which are not confined to the Bible but happen every now and then in the lives of the saints.
- b.* Inspiration, which is not, however, inerrant, but is conditioned by the ignorance and imperfection of the mind through which it is mediated.
- c.* Special providences and answers to prayer, which are not merely subjective.
- d.* The Incarnation, the supreme and perfect manifestation of God.
- e.* The Church, as the extension of the Incarnation, and the priesthood as the organ by which it reaches the individual.

f. The sacraments, as effectual symbols conveying God's grace.

(a) *Miracles and the idea of particular action.*—Says F. R. Tennant, in a little book entitled *Miracle*, "A miracle (and the reasoning extends to all the other special manifestations of divine activity that I have enumerated)—A miracle, in order to be distinguished in thought from Nature, from the settled order which is its necessary background, must be defined not only as an exception to law, but as due to supernatural causation. As I am now using the terms 'natural' and 'supernatural,' natural causation means the immanent and transient action of created things; supernatural causation means fresh, direct, unmediated or non-devolved, intrusive or interpolated, activity on the part of the Creator. Insofar as Nature is left to her own devices, so to speak, and behaves *as if* God-forsaken, we are presented with the natural. . . . Unless the order of created things, especially physical things, were largely left to itself—unless there be *some* truth in the so-called deistic doctrine of an 'Absentee God'—it seems to me impossible to give credence to science or to theism, or to find even a partial and proximate solution of the problem set by the existence of evil in God's world." The author draws a distinction, which seems to me to be a necessary distinction, between activity devolved upon created things from which the Deity stands a hand-breadth off to give free play, and the direct or non-devolved activity of God.

I am unable to see any reason why we should accept the freedom of the human will—or for that matter any theory of the interrelation between mind and body—and boggle at the notion of a special divine activity. When through energizing the muscles of our arm we operate a pump, we make water flow upward. We violate, however, no law of nature; we but combine forces each of which is purely natural, forces which Nature herself does not combine, and so we produce an effect that Nature herself does not produce.

It by no means results, however, that we must swallow

whole the body of narratives of the miraculous, or other special divine action. We may re-examine each narrative in the light of fresh knowledge and determine in any case whether the evidence of the fact is insufficient or the circumstances appear to rule out any special supernatural agency.

(b) *Inspiration*.—The case of inspiration is slightly different. Here the special divine activity appears to take place, not in the outside world, but in the soul of the believer. Does God in truth come to the soul, or does the soul go to God? Is God, in fact, like some distant snow-clad mountain peak that only appears to move as the traveler approaches it? Or, to put the case more baldly yet, is God involved at all, or are the experiences of inspiration, conversion, and the like, delusions that begin and end within the soul itself? I confess that I am unable to see why we should not take the religious experience of all the ages at its face value. To be sure we cannot hear God speak unless we attend. But it does not seem to me that the evidence discloses that God is always talking to us and that we have merely to listen to hear Him. On the contrary the mystics of all ages and all religions bear witness to what they call "the dark night of the soul," when the voice of Heaven is silent and the face of God is veiled. Even the Son of Man upon the cross could cry, "My God, My God, Why hast Thou forsaken me?"

(c) *Special providences and answers to prayer*.—No element is more closely interwoven in the teaching of Jesus and the belief of Christendom than that God does answer prayer; that He does intervene objectively in the course of events in answer to the faithful petitions of His children. This element, and this alone, of the whole realm of the Numinous was taken over into the theology of Protestantism. Church and sacraments were evacuated of the Numinous; miracles and inspiration were limited to times past. But the Reformer, in common with the Catholic, when he fell upon his knees and lifted up his heart, was assured that he was in the very presence of the Almighty, and that, if it was God's will, the course of Nature

would be changed in answer to his prayer. Then men made bold to approach the throne of grace. Now one cannot but be struck with their timidity. There is no more convincing proof of the extent to which Modernism has entered into the very soul of Protestantism than the prayers that are offered in Protestant churches. These, while addressed to God, seem to be intended for the congregation. Often they are merely meditations. When they are petitionary in form the things prayed for are purely subjective—change of heart or amendment of life. It is as if the petitioners were not quite sure whether the answer would come from without, or entirely from within themselves, and wanted to be on the safe side. Their native hue of resolution sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought, they dare not ask God for something that He might not be *able* to bestow.

Of course, if one is to be a thorough-going Modernist, there must be no quibbling at this point. If there *is* an effective answer to prayer, if something happens other than auto-suggestion, then the whole case is given away; and there is no logical defense to the position of the Catholic, that God acts externally to His universe and particularly. Yet there is no phenomenon in the whole sphere of religion so well established as the objective answer to prayer. Not only in Christianity, but in all religions, do men pray; and the testimony is unanimous that their prayers are answered, not only through moving the hearts and minds of other individuals, but even in the physical world.

The hesitation that is felt at present in giving full faith and credit to this well-nigh universal experience arises because it runs counter to our pre-conceived notion that the whole of Reality can be accounted for in electrons and physical causation. In this respect it would appear that we have given away altogether too much. The latest development of the quantum theory appears to be that, after all, the "laws" of science are merely "statistical laws"—that is, statements of how, on the average, things will behave themselves—and are

not statements of invariable sequences, and that the seeming inevitability of natural phenomena is due to the enormous number of smaller phenomena that are involved.⁶

(d) *The Incarnation*.—Orthodox Christian thought, Catholic and Protestant alike, has always recognized in Christ the supreme and perfect manifestation of God, a manifestation not mediated by human or material agencies, but immediate. At the same time it has always recognized in Christ a complete humanity. This is not properly speaking dogma at all, but immediate religious experience, the experience of those who knew Him in the flesh, and of those who have known Him since in the spirit. After numerous attempts to frame a theory, or dogma, as to how this might be, the Church finally gave it up, and contented itself, in the decree of Chalcedon, with re-affirming the fact. Every age has worked out its own theory. Within the past few years there has been a renewal of discussion, involving on the part of some Modernists a denial of the fact of the two natures, and on the part

⁶ See A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (1928), especially the chapters entitled The New Quantum Theory, Causation, Science and Mysticism, and Conclusion. Mr. Eddington says (p. 301): "Thus in the structure of the world as formulated in the new quantum theory it is predetermined that of 500 atoms now in State 3, approximately 400 will go on to State 1 and 100 to State 2—in so far as anything subject to chance fluctuations can be said to be predetermined. . . . There are no marks distinguishing the atoms belonging to the group of the 100 from the 400." Again (pp. 331-2): "The symbolic nature of the entities of physics is now generally recognized; and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a way as to make it self-evident that it is a partial aspect of something wider. Strict causality is abandoned in the material world. Our ideas of the controlling laws are in process of reconstruction and it is not possible to predict what kind of form they will ultimately take; but all the indications are that strict causality has dropped out permanently. This relieves the former necessity of supposing that mind is subject to deterministic law, or that it can suspend deterministic law in the material world." It is well, however, to observe the author's caution: "Those who look over the scientist's shoulder and use the present partially developed picture for purposes outside science, do so at their own risk." It will not do, as theologians have sometimes done with scientific discoveries, to forthwith construct a theology on the supposed indeterminism of the atom, for this theory may be superseded. Yet, says Mr. Eddington, "We may pass on to some yet newer outlook on the world; but we can never get back to the old outlook" (of absolute determinism).

of other Modernists and many orthodox theologians an attempt to arrive at a theory which shall not involve such denial. There is as yet no general agreement; but there are signs that a consensus may be arrived at, within the limits of Chalcedon, which shall present the matter in modern thought forms.

(e) *The Church*.—According to the orthodox philosophy, Catholic and Protestant alike, the Church is a divine organism; that is, it has in some sense an objective existence including but transcending the individuals that compose it; and in and through this organism God speaks and acts in particular. While the form of Church organization has varied considerably, this idea of the Church was not, as liberal theologians would have us believe, a corruption foisted upon Christianity, but was inherent from the beginning. As soon as the first believers became self-conscious of a distinction between themselves and the Jewish nation and religion, they conceived of their *koinônia* as an *ekklesia* invested with the same supernatural authority and numinous quality as had inhered in the Jewish nation. The Church, in Saint Paul's thinking, is the Body of Christ and we are severally His members. This view prevailed universally until the Reformation, and was, in fact, held by the first reformers. Soon, however, the logic of events compelled a modification, so that the Protestant bodies, that had now definitely severed their connection with the Great Church, might retain for themselves the supernatural concept. Accordingly, Protestant theology evolved the idea of an invisible Church, being the invisible unity of believers, of the baptized, or of the elect. What is meant by invisible unity is hard to understand. Of course in the literal sense all unity is invisible. One sees only the individuals who compose the Church; just as one sees only the cells which compose the human body. In both cases the unity is unity of function, and you can't see function. But you can see the results of the common functioning of the cells of the body; and the Catholic claims precisely this for the Church. In

asserting that the unity of the Church is invisible, therefore, it would seem that the Protestant theologian is confronted with a fatal dilemma. Either he holds that the results of the common functioning of the individual members of the Church are possible to detect, that something happens which would not have happened if they had functioned wholly as individuals; in which case the Catholic theory of the Church is vindicated. Or else he means that the results of that common functioning are *not* possible to detect. This would seem to empty his concept of any meaning whatever, unless he is prepared to hold with the Scholastics that the Substance of a thing bears no relation to its Accidents.

It seems to me that the verdict of history rests with the theory of a God-inspired, visible Church. There is a stamina in the bodies that hold and act upon that theory, a toughness, a tendency to resist cleavage, an ability to digest, transform, and assimilate usages and beliefs brought in from without, which looks strikingly like the behavior of a living organism.

On the other hand, as against the doctrine of a God-inspired visible Church, we are confronted with the difficulty that the Church has often been cold and cruel and wicked, so that it might rather seem to be possessed of the devil. Yet we should remember that the case is not otherwise with the individual. The greatest saint may be on occasion the greatest sinner. Like the men of whom she is composed, the Church must ever battle the world, the flesh, and the devil. Yet for all her sins, the Church has maintained the cause of righteousness almost single-handed through nineteen Christian centuries. Nay more, we find it to be the universal religious experience of the race that contact with God is mediated through an organized body in which He dwells.

The experience of history does, however, forbid us to be over-bold in defining the limits of the Church or its form of organization. Who are we that we should set bounds to the Spirit of God. Not only Jerusalem, Constantinople, and Rome, but also Canterbury, have erred; and these all, and also

Geneva and Augsburg and Westminster, have achieved. As for the priesthood, while we ought to stand fast for its divine authority, we ought never to forget that presbyter is but priest writ large. All that the situation demands, as it seems to me, is that Augsburg and Geneva and Westminster should realize, or rather enter upon, that sacred ministry to which we believe them to be entitled; that presbyter should remember that he is priest. It seems that Protestantism is burdened with an inferiority complex that it must needs throw off.

(f) *Sacraments*.—Involved in the belief that God acts toward man in particular is the idea of sacraments, of special ritual acts that mediate His presence. It has always been the religious experience of mankind to find that He manifests Himself through the material. The evidence is collected in such works as Frazer's *Golden Bough* and Preserved Smith's *The History of Theophagy*. Demonstration that a parallel to any Christian practice is to be found in heathen cults is often regarded as sufficient to condemn the practice as superstitious and false. I do not so read history. I do not believe that the Holy Spirit has been so chary in His intercourse with mankind as not to have manifested Himself in all faiths. Since when was the universality of a phenomenon proof of its falsity? Throughout history men have experienced the divine through participation in certain ritual acts; and the reality of that experience cannot be questioned on any hypothesis other than one which denies altogether the existence of God or the possibility of intercourse with Him. If these experiences are purely subjective, then so are inspiration, answer to prayer, and all the rest.

A sacrament is an outward and visible sign with and through which is conveyed an inward and spiritual grace. A sacrament is a symbol, yes. But what sort of symbol? According to Protestant philosophy it is a representative symbol merely. Its effect upon the worshiper, if any, is merely subjective—it awakens by association of ideas certain trains of thought or action, but the elements of such activity

are already present in the soul, nothing is added from without. In the Catholic philosophy God himself speaks to the soul.

The interrelation of the spiritual and material is not confined to religion. The written or spoken word is but a symbol, and an arbitrary symbol at that. Yet it conveys a spiritual meaning and effects a result that bears no relation whatever to the intrinsic nature of the waves of light or of sound that compose it. A sacrament is a divine word.

Now these divine words are not confined to two, or indeed to seven. Whenever God uses the material to bring man to Him, there is a sacrament. Catholic theory recognizes an unlimited number of "sacramentals" and of these it only, after much hesitation, designated seven as peculiarly entitled to the designation of "sacrament."

The objection is made that God is everywhere and hence not really present in any peculiar sense in a sacrament. But presence or absence is not a matter of space. You and I may be within arm's reach of one another; and if we are in adjoining rooms and a curtain hangs between, I am not in your presence. In the sacrament the curtain is drawn aside and we glimpse for a moment, if not the face of God, at least the edge of his garment.

Time does not permit of a detailed view of the sacraments; but since the Eucharist is regarded as being supremely and specially sacramental, it will be of advantage to discuss the theory of it, and what is said of *it* will *a fortiori* apply to the others.

The Eucharistic philosophy developed gradually in the Church as the attempt to evaluate the words of the Master, "This is my body; this is my blood," in the light of the religious experience of believers. This philosophy, in its main lines, became settled very early, but in its details it has changed with the change in the whole intellectual atmosphere of successive periods and ought never to become entirely static. Just at present, this doctrine, in common with all doctrines, is undergoing re-examination.

Stripped of all details of theory, the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, held in common by Roman, Eastern, and Anglican, is that under the forms of bread and wine the spiritual body of Christ is really and objectively present. While the perception of that presence and any benefit therefrom depend upon the faith of the believer, nevertheless, it is held Christ is present. Be it noted, first of all, that no theory, not even the extreme Roman form of the doctrine, holds that the body present is the mortal body of our Lord, but the spiritual body with which He was clothed at the resurrection and in which He ascended into Heaven.

The problem for philosophy then is whether we are justified in thinking of a sacramental action or object in terms of its whole significance, in regarding it as something which is fundamentally spiritual, but has a certain physical expression; or whether we must treat the material expression as peculiarly real, or at the least as something that must be carefully distinguished in thought.

"Matter," said Clerk Maxwell, the eminent English physicist, after recounting and rejecting the many efforts to define it in terms of itself,—*"Matter is the permanent possibility of sensation."* Perhaps, in view of recent physical theory, we should now prefer to say *"the relatively permanent possibility of sensation."* It is a fundamental of metaphysics that the objects presented to consciousness consist of both external and internal components. A cake of soap looks red, feels hard, smells like a rose. The redness, hardness and rose odor correspond to something in the object, yet these qualities, or for the matter of that the qualities of size and weight, cannot be referred entirely to the external object, but lie in part in the observer. If we wish to become ultra-scientific and reduce the external element entirely to electrons, protons and photons in motion, we haven't soap any more, but only electrons—and even these we cannot conceive of as other than very small shot. Now if the symbolism in the Eucharist is effectual symbolism, that is if the consecrated bread and wine

afford, as experience shows they do afford, real spiritual opportunities, then these opportunities have the same basis as the opportunities of physical experience, and the sacramental elements become not only the relatively permanent possibility of physical sensation, but also the relatively permanent possibility of spiritual experience. There is no ground, either in regard to certainty of opportunity, or in regard to ultimacy of association, for treating the opportunities of physical experience as more fundamental. Nor is there any ground in the fact that the appropriation of the spiritual opportunities involves our coöperation. The case is the same regarding physical sensation. Blindness, whether it be physical or spiritual, is a bar to perception. After consecration the Host is changed, not by any change in the opportunities of physical experience which previously constituted the object, not by any change in anything which can be correlated in terms of electrons, but by the addition of opportunities of spiritual experience, in that, by devout communion, we are made partakers in Christ. If it is difficult to realize this, it is difficult only because we tend to think of matter as peculiarly real, and of things spiritual either as less real, or, at least, as some separate realm. Yet, unless we learn to think of all our experience as a unity that is partially, but only partially, analyzable in terms of electrons there is no room for either freedom or immortality.⁷

Such then is the philosophy which I urge—a synthesis of the old and the new—or rather a reinterpretation of the old philosophy in the atmosphere and climate of the present day and in full recognition of the spiritual and physical experience that have led men temporarily, as I believe, to reject it. The reasoning that I have adduced may be faulty or soon outdated; but the fundamental principles are, I believe, based upon the bed-rock of religious experience and can only be escaped by

⁷ The substance of this discussion of the Eucharist is largely from the paper by A. E. Taylor and Will Spens entitled 'The Real Presence' in Proceedings of the Anglo-Catholic Congress of 1927.

disregarding that experience and cutting away half, and that the better half, of what life teaches. I plead for the recognition of answer to prayer that is not a mere echo of the prayer itself, of inspiration that is not auto-suggestion, of sacraments that are effectual vehicles of God's grace—of a God who is not imprisoned within the material universe but who transcends it and uses it for His purposes. I bespeak a Church that not only upholds an ideal of righteousness but furnishes the means of attaining it, that teaches, not religion but a Religion.

WORSHIP AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

A SERMON

By A. L. LILLEY, Hereford, England

"I beseech you, brethren, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service." Rom. xii. 1.

There is nothing perhaps more necessary to the Christian life than that it should from its very beginnings be consciously connected with a true conception of worship. Now all the great Christian theologians who have dealt with this subject are agreed in basing their discussion of it on that great saying of St. Paul which I have taken for my text. They have all alike recognised that the only true and adequate worship of God, the only worship of Him which is in accordance with the true reason, is the service of a life accordant with His law. For that true worship, symbolical worship, the worship which we offer through certain forms and on certain formal occasions, can never be a substitute. But on the other hand that vital worship can never dispense with the various aids and stimulations which the worship of set forms and occasions so abundantly supplies. Our worship here in church ought to be for us all, from the oldest to the youngest, a conscious discipline of our spirits so that they may be able through every bodily function and activity to respond to and obey the will of God.

Let us consider for a moment in what that discipline consists. Every time we meet here to take part in an act of worship we are leaving behind for a moment all the various interests, interests often in conflict with one another and always confusing by their mere variety and disconnectedness, which fill up the foreground of our existence. And we are or ought to be concentrating in thought on a permanent and unchanging background to life, a background which is the

same for all our lives, a background whose unchangeable perfection alone gives meaning to our otherwise blind, unmeaning, purposeless activities. That background to life is God. But merely to call it God, even though with a certain awed reverence, is not enough. That reverence indeed is of the very essence of religion and of worship. Yet not only is it not independent of thought, but without thought it cannot persist. We ought in every act of worship to ascend, as the greatest of mediæval theologians put it, with the mind towards God. That ascent of the mind to God was his definition of prayer, and no better or more adequate definition can ever probably be attempted. And first of all that ascent will mean, as it meant for him, the conscious contemplation of a supreme reason there in the eternal background of life. Here in the foreground there are our own poor efforts to be reasonable, to find in our own activities and in the play of natural forces around us which so greatly limit and determine our activities some poor imperfect show of reason. And those efforts so often fall back defeated that the temptation to become altogether sceptical as to the rationality of the universe is great and insistent. It may be all, we are inclined to think at times, nothing more than the accidental play of blind forces of which we are the puppets and the dupes. But again some fundamental sanity in us saves us from thinking thus brain-sickly of things, persuades us that our reason, however confused and imperfect its methods, however unsatisfying and even self-stultifying its results may often appear to be, is yet the legitimate offspring of a Supreme, an Eternal and Perfect Reason, in which and through which all things subsist. It is our belief in that background of absolute reason that alone gives sanity, meaning, purpose to all our experiences. And one object of all our worship is to foster and cultivate in ourselves that supremely true and saving belief by contemplating with reverential awe the ultimate and perfect reason which alone gives reality and value to our own poor gropings after truth.

Again the foreground of life is a scene of the most baffling moral confusion. It is not only that we human souls are infinitely careless about the clearly-known distinctions of right and wrong, that we thoughtlessly stake upon the wayward issues of some passing attraction, of some momentary advantage or pleasure, the sterling coin that has been minted in the general conscience of humanity as if it were so many worthless counters. That moral levity in ourselves and in the whole world of men about us is a sufficient stumbling-block to the soul that still tries to preserve its native eagerness for right. But there is something more perplexing still. It is that so often the way of right is not clear at all, that in the court of conscience no clear and unequivocal verdict is obtainable on matters which most urgently demand an unhesitating judgment. There are cases where we must decide in order to act, and yet where every possible decision entails some injury to others which we should have wished to avoid and yet which cannot be avoided. The only difference between one decision and another is a difference in the direction of the injury, a difference in the persons on whom it must fall. And what a long-drawn moral agony life would be if this foreground were its all, if faith did not perceive an eternal background of immutable right which inspires, upholds, and leads to a blessed completion our faithful if faulty gropings and endeavours after right. Again worship is the joyful contemplation of that Eternal Right by which our souls are disciplined for right action in this world of mists and imperfect lights.

Again our life is regulated in a degree surpassing all other by its affection. We are still more fundamentally social beings than even creatures of thought and of action. What supremely makes us men, what constitutes the specific quality in us which we call humanity, is some secret sympathy between us in virtue of which we share one another's experience more intimately than we can express it to one another in word or through any other outward symbol. Yet here again all is



imperfection, disappointment, confusion. Our affections are so often betrayed by their own short-sighted eagerness. They are undisciplined, inconstant, even domineering. In their despotic claim of monopoly they violate that reverence which it is their supreme function to cultivate and foster. From being the salt of life they may become its poison, from the means of its purification the cause of its putrefaction. They were meant to educate the self into the divine power of being a more-than-self. But they may alas! inflame the self into the madness of a fever which is self-consuming and self-destructive. Or they may simply die away and leave us the mere husks of men, soulless and solitary in a loveless world. But again faith desires a background to life of Eternal Love, of the patient abiding sympathy of an Eternal Heart which believes in men even though they lose belief in themselves, which by its inexhaustible love and understanding is working to redeem them throughout the eternities. And worship is again the faithful, diligent, ever-renewed contemplation of this Infinite Love.

The life which we men have to live upon this earth is a life of thought and knowledge, a life of action, and a life of affection. Those elements and aspects of our life may not all be of equal value. The native capacity for one or the other may vary for each of us. But assuredly they are all necessary for the fullness of life, and each of them depends for its due development upon the due cultivation of the others. The thinker who is not also in some degree a man of action suffers even in his thought. It becomes cold, abstract, uninspiring. And again the man of action who does not or cannot give himself time to reflect deeply and sincerely on the larger bearings of his own action and on the kind of purposiveness that makes all human action worthy is in danger of becoming a mere soulless piece of human machinery. And once again both thought and action will be dry and sapless, useless for the world's deepest needs, unless they are rooted in a patient and untiring sympathy, unless they proceed from a passionate

desire to understand, to help, to serve not men as we want them to be but men as they are. Life so conceived and lived is the true worship of God, but that life depends upon the constant contemplation of God as the Supreme Reason, the Supreme Goodness, the Supreme Love by whom our poor imperfect thought and action and affection are accepted and made fruitful. And just that is worship.

DE MODO PRAEDICANDI

(Little is known of this "Frater Ricardus de Tefford" whose *Summa de Modo Praedicandi* is found in MS. Bodl. 631 f IV b. It has, I believe, never been published and may be of some interest to students of the preaching of the Middle Ages. In the MS. it forms a sort of preface to a most interesting topical Concordance of Scripture, which, in turn, appears to be the source of the Concordance often attributed to Anthony of Padua.)

Summa fratris Ricardi de Tefford de modo praedicandi. Istis modis potest quis abundare in themate.

Primo per qualemcumque termini notificationem. Verbi gratia. Iustus ut palma florebit. Iustus est qui reddit unicuique quod suum est. Superioribus. Equalibus. Inferioribus.

Per divisionem. Verbi gratia. Si in themate fit caput, caput dividitur. Christus, prelatus, mens, operatio.

Per ratiocinationem vicissem videlicet ratiocinando de contrariis unum approbando et aliud detestando. Ut si quis velit laudare castitatem potest per detestationem oppositi. Ad eundem pertinent ratiocinatio per similia. Ut stultus esset qui funem texerat quo suspenderetur, ergo stultus est peccator qui peccatum facit quo damnetur. Ad eundem etiam pertinet ratiocinatio per exempla. Ut Christus innocens per tribulationes intravit in regnum suum, ergo multo magis peccator in regnum alienum.

Per concordantias. Ut Beatus vir qui suffert temptationes. De eodem. Beatus vir qui in sapientia morabitur.

Per ea quae conveniunt in radice, licet diversituntur in modo. Ut cum fit processus de comparativo ad superlativum. Ut Accingere gladio tuo super femur tuum potentissime. Potenter coniugati. Potentius continentes. Potentissime virgines. Ad eundem pertinet processus per diversas compositiones. Ut Quaerite faciem eius semper. Quaeritur Deus in baptismo. Requiritur in poenitentia. Exquiritur per bona

opera. Inquiritur meditando de lege divina. Adquiritur in patria.

Per proprietates rei. Iustus germinabit sicut liliū. Iustus lilio comparatur. Quia liliū candidum, odoriferum, crescit iuxta aquas. Sicut iustus candidus per castitatem, odorifer per bonam famam proficit iuxta aquas tribulationum et gratiarum.

Per quadruplices generales expositiones scilicet historialiter allegorice moraliter anagogice. Ut Ierusalem quae aedificatur ut civitas. Historialiter de terrestri Ierusalem. Allegorice de ecclesia militante. Moraliter de anima fidei. Anagogice de ecclesia triumphante.

Per causas et effectus. Ut si sit sermo de humilitate. Quae-rantur causae humilitatis ut Dei potentia misera propria et huius modi. Item per effectus. Ut sic. Humilitas liberat illuminat impetrat gratiam acquirit conservat exaltat glorificat. Liberat. Unde Humiliatus sum et liberavit me. Illuminat per intelligentiam. Unde Intellectum dat parvulis. Impetrat. Unde Respexit in orationem humilium, et Ecclesiasticus Oratio humiliantis. Gratiam acquirit. Unde Petrus Humilibus dat gratiam. Conservat. Gregorius Humilitas conservat in omni temptatione ut illi non crepent in fornace qui non tument ventre superbiae. Exaltat. Unde Qui se humiliat exaltabitur. Glorificat. Unde Job Qui humiliatus fuerit erit in gloria.

W. F. WHITMAN

ALMOST THOU PERSUADEST ME TO BECOME A CHRISTIAN

By J. E. HARRY, St. Stephen's College, Columbia University

New Testament exegesis lies outside of my bailiwick, and it is with some hesitation that I accede to the request of the editor to discuss Acts 26:28.

My experience in hermeneutics and criticism has taught me to be cautious rather than cocksure, Socratic rather than dogmatic, and what I have to say about this troublesome passage should be considered as suggestions of a layman, not as the dicta of an authority. There is one point, however, on which I think I may venture to be dogmatic, and that is, the first two Greek words do not mean "almost." That the last word does not signify "become" goes without saying. *Γενέσθαι* is regularly a passive of *ποιῆσαι*, but that the latter could be used for the former is quite beyond reason. I have read the Greek authors from Homer to Zonaras, and through these two thousand years of literature I have never come across a single example of *ἐν ὀλίγῳ* in the sense of "almost." Nor does it mean, in my opinion, "in a little time," or "with little trouble," as the German authorities expound it. The natural meaning is "ein bisschen," "un' peu." St. Paul understood what Agrippa was saying, if we do not, and in his answer he says: *καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ*. This bars from court at once *ἐν ὀλίγῳ* in the sense of *ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ*, for the Greeks looked upon time as quantity rather than length. We should expect *ἐν πολλῷ*, if the apostle had understood *ἐν ὀλίγῳ* in the sense of "in a little time." Moreover, St. Paul *does* use *γενέσθαι* after *ἐξαιμην ἄν*, and this shows that he considered *με* as the object of *ποιῆσαι*, not of *πείθειν*. Furthermore, those who translate "thou wouldst fain make me a Christian" wrench from the sentence a meaning it

cannot bear. There is nothing so tricky as translation—*traduttore traditore* (translator, traitor), say the Italians. No language is an exact register of thought, and hardly any word or phrase in one language exactly covers that in another. English may be clear, but often is not. Greek must be clear, or it is not Greek. Now, "thou wouldst fain" gives the sense which the translators want to put into the verb *πείθεις*, but it does not *translate* *πείθεις*. It *does* translate the tense—after a fashion—but the verb itself is left untranslated, for it means "thou art endeavoring to persuade."

The first two words, then, and the last, mean respectively "somewhat" and "to make." The juxtaposed words (*με* and *Χριστιανόν*) offer no difficulty. *Relictum est πείθεις*. What does it mean? If the text is sound, Agrippa is saying: "Thou are attempting to persuade." Whom? "Me." To do what? "To make." What? "A Christian." Of whom? Ay, there's the rub. There is no object, for *με* must be taken with *πείθεις*. If it is also the object of *ποιῆσαι*, we have a very curious Greek sentence. Besides, we should expect *ἐμάντῳ*. But the *active* infinitive (*ποιῆσαι*) throws the machinery out of gear. What the context demands is a complementary infinitive. True, Euripides uses the simple infinitive sometimes consecutively (without *ὥστε*), and occasionally the infinitive is used to express purpose. But the sentence fails to convey a clear thought with either construction. The form *γενέσθαι*, which is found in inferior manuscripts, is merely the result of an effort on the part of some ancient editor to bring order out of chaos, sense out of nonsense. We want a verb of desire before *ποιῆσαι*. So *ποθεῖς* occurred to me—since Sinaiticus reads *πιθεις* (which might also stand for *πείθεις*, by itacism)—but *ποθεῖν* is not a N. T. word, while *πέποιθας* is too unlike the original. *Ἐπιποθεῖν*, however, does occur, and this fits in the sentence admirably. But an emendation, to be accepted, must be irresistible, must satisfy the soul, and I confess that *ἐπιποθεῖς* does not—for palæographical reasons. If it should happen to be

correct, the reading of our manuscripts could be explained only on the basis of haplography, με πιπθεις becoming με πιθεις. Neither the human eye nor the human ear is infallible. It is very easy to make a Schreibfehler or a Sprachfehler. On going over my manuscript of Aeschylus and Sophocles recently—in my own handwriting—I was surprised to find so many errors in the revised form, and, curiously enough, the same kind of mistakes that occur in our Greek codices—haplography, dittography, omission and transposition of letters. Some errors were due to sight, others to sound. Official stenographers in Washington testified that two commissioners “stopped in disgust” the reading of an order, whereas they had only *stopped and discussed* the reading.

When you have done a thing ἐν ὀλίγῳ, you have hardly got started, but “almost” implies that the act is practically completed—you have nearly reached the goal. St. Paul was not satisfied with a lukewarm Christian, a little bit of a one: so he declares that he would have Agrippa a Christian καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ—a phrase which obviously is to be connected with γενέσθαι. This seems to indicate that Agrippa, too, construed ἐν ὀλίγῳ with ποιῆσαι, not with πείθει. I published something on the meaning of this phrase some twenty years ago, and I have since seen nothing to make me reverse my judgement. And, after all, is it not rather absurd to make St. Paul declare that he would fain make Agrippa a Christian *both in a little time and in a big time* or pray that he, Agrippa, and all who were listening might be *both with little trouble and with big trouble* such as he, Paul, except these shackles? And has not Paul himself just used the same phrase only a minute before (verse 22), in an entirely different sense: μαρτυρόμενος μικρῷ τε καὶ μεγάλῳ?

A deal of work remains to be done in Greek grammar, lexicography and hermeneutics. Words with false meanings are still handed down from generation to generation. Our lexica contain cargoes of errors—a φόρτος κακῶν. Hundreds of passages in the Greek dramatists alone are still unsatis-

factorily, and many, very many, most certainly incorrectly interpreted. We are reading the Greek of modern savants, not that of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. In verse 98 of the *Iphigenia among the Taurians* practically all the great scholars print λάθοιμεν: Sallier, Reiske, Badham, Markland, Matthiae, Musgrave, Bothe, Klotz, Nauck, Kirchhoff, Murray. The manuscripts read μάθοιμεν, and the manuscripts are right, for it is in another part of the sentence that the scribe slipped. We must be conservative, must preserve the tradition of the text until the true solution of the riddle is found. When discovered, it will be found to be very simple, and generally the letters will prove to be almost identical with those of the manuscripts. We should approach our task as Bacon did, "with humility to linger and meditate thereon, and with minds washed clean from opinions to study it." We must first get the facts. The results of my study of the perfect imperative, subjunctive and optative have at last found their way into one American grammar. The European text-books are still printing the old paradigms, handed down from manual to manual and from century to century, and in handbooks of the grammar of the Greek Testament I still find the non-existent πεπίστευκε, πεπιστευκέτω. Very old grammars were wont to print even FUTURE SUBJUNCTIVE, with an "Omitted" at the top of the blank space, in which one bright boy wrote: "Omitted! Thank God!"

Let us get the facts before we tamper with the sacred texts. Interpretation should always be exhausted before we resort to emendation.

But, as if in mockery, or with tragic irony, an emendation pops into my mind just as I write these words, with which I intended to bring this note to a close. But it is only a conjecture.

I observe that right above πείθεις stands πιστεύεις, and above that another πιστεύεις, and above that πείδομαι. The ideas of πίστις and πεινώ are floating around in the scribe's mind. Suppose he sees with the visual ray πιζεις, but

with his mind's eye *πιθεις* (*θ* and *ζ* are not so very unlike in old printed texts, while in cursive they could easily be confused), and writes the very letters that appear in Sinaiticus, inadvertently omitting the preceding liquid (*λ*), just as the scribe did who made *ἀλλὰ πῶς φράσον* out of *ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς φράσον* in Aeschylus, *Suppliants* 464. Then the two words appear to him as *με <λ> πιζεις*, the first *ε* disappearing by elision, or the second by haplography. Nothing is left of the verb but the truncated *λπιζεις*, and this fact would account ἐν μικρῷ for the dropping out of *λ*. And certainly *ἐλπιζεις* brings *ποιῆσαι* to its rights and at the same time harmonizes with Paul's reply *εὐξαίμην ἂν κτέ*. If it be objected that we should expect the future after this verb, I reply that we should also expect the future with *εὐξαίμην*, which is followed, however, by *γενέσθαι*. In fact the aorist infinitive is found not unfrequently in classical Greek with verbs and expressions signifying "hope"; and it is a perfectly natural construction, for when used with the aorist infinitive—less often the present—*ἐλπιζειν* is a verb of will or desire, in other words, precisely what we want in the passage under discussion. And does not the sentence now—whether read as a statement or as a question—harmonize both with what St. Paul has been saying from the very beginning of his discourse and especially with his last words: *πιστεύεις, βασιλεῦ Ἀγρίππα, τοῖς προφήταις; οἶδα ὅτι πιστεύεις?*

COPTIC GNOSTIC WRITINGS

By FRANK HUDSON HALLOCK, Western Theological Seminary

Egypt was always fertile in heresies; Carpocrates, Basilides, Valentinus were all natives of Egypt.¹ Until the firm establishment of the episcopate at Alexandria early Egyptian Christianity was largely infected with both Gnostic and pagan elements. Gnosticism, here as elsewhere, was the real enemy to the progress of Christianity. It reached its height in the systems of Basilides and Valentinus, both of whom taught in Egypt; both Hippolytus and Epiphanius indicate its especial strength. It was rapidly dying out when Arianism arose.

With very slight exceptions our knowledge, apart from the Coptic sources which we are to study, has been drawn from opponents—S. Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, S. Epiphanius, and upon their accounts later students have inevitably been obliged to depend. Coptic writings, then, supply us material of the first order of importance. In addition to the lengthy Pistis Sophia and the two Books of Jeû, we have Coptic Gnostic fragments and various magical formulæ, from all of which we are able to extract some knowledge of Gnosticism as it was expressed by those who had embraced it.

The fundamental principles are everywhere the same: that God is unknowable; that there is a Demiurge creator; that æons in various systems of emanations bridge the gap between God and man;² that the life of Christ is an allegory

¹ At the same time there is truth in what LeQuien says, *Oriens Christianus*, 2: 363; "primum quidem sanæ fidei tenacissima perseveravit a S. Marco institutore suo ad Dioscorum usque et Timotheum illum Aelurum, imo Marci sedes orthodoxæ doctrinæ regula habebatur." The Church as a whole maintained its orthodoxy unquestioned until Chalcedon, though many individuals fell away into the heresies which sprang up in Egypt.

² C. Schmidt, *Gnostische Schriften in Koptischer Sprache*, p. 423, "Dieselbe ist die Signatur aller gnostischen Systeme, das Hauptdogma der gnostischen Lehre."

with a hidden meaning, only to be understood by the initiate.³ Mysticism and magical practices, long existent in Egypt, had, under Greek influence, become philosophical, or, better, pseudo-philosophical. Under this combined Egyptian and Hellenistic influence Judaism before the coming of Christianity had evolved an inner, esoteric doctrine from the Scriptures. The influence of Eastern cults—Atys, Mithra, Zoroaster, perhaps Buddha, had entered also.⁴ Isis and Osiris legends under Greek hands had been transcendentalized in the direction of Platonic idealism. Syncretism thrived as nowhere else in the "world-embracing" atmosphere of Alexandria; even in orthodox circles the difference between Clement of Alexandria and his contemporary Tertullian is great.

Pistis Sophia.—The only known manuscript of this work was sold by the heirs of its first owner, Dr. Askew, to the British Museum in 1785; there it is known as Ms. Additional 5114. Askew is said to have bought it from an English bookseller; its prior history is wholly unknown. It is a lengthy work, 356 pages, two columns to the page, each consisting of from thirty to thirty-four lines. It is in a very well-preserved condition, only sixteen pages being missing. It is the work of two scribes, the differences in writing being easily discerned, though the scribes were probably contemporaries; to their work some emendations have been added by a later hand. The form of the Sahidic dialect is early.

C. Woide⁵ was the first to notice it, and assigned it to the

³ *Ibid.*, p. 435, "Bei alledem ist die geschichtliche Persönlichkeit des Erlösers ganz verflüchtigt. Von seinen Wundern und Predigten, von der Bedeutung seines Leidens und Sterbens, d. h. von dem uns in den Evangelien geschilderten Heiland, weiss unser Verfasser gar nichts; alles dies existierte für einen Gnostiker nicht, da es für ihn keinen Wert hatte." *Ibid.*, p. 437, "mit einem Wort: er ist ein grosser Magier, dem alle Geister und Welten dienstbar sind."

⁴ W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, studies the Oriental contributions exhaustively and carries many back to ancient Babylonia.

⁵ *Beiträge zur Förderung theologischer und anderer wichtigen Kenntnisse*, vol. iii, pp. 55 sqq., Kiel und Hamburg, 1778; *Appendix ad editionem Novi Testamenti Graeci e codice Ms. Alexandrino*, Oxonii, 1799.

fourth century; of later students Schmidt,⁶ with greatest probability, has assigned it to the fifth century, Amélineau⁷ to the ninth or tenth, Hyvernat⁸ to the sixth. Harnack⁹ assigns the Greek original¹⁰ to the second half of the third century.

Woide made a copy of PS, upon which some comments were made by the Danish bishop Münter,¹¹ and later by Dulaurier.¹² In 1851 an edition of the text with a Latin translation appeared;¹³ this was begun by M. G. Schwartz, who, unfortunately, died before the work was quite completed; it was finished and published by J. H. Petermann whose knowledge of Coptic was hardly sufficient for the difficult task. This edition, however, served to make PS better known, and the work of later scholars—Köstlin,¹⁴ Lipsius,¹⁵ Mead,¹⁶ Horner,¹⁷ in addition to those already mentioned, has done for it all, perhaps, that can be done to make it intelligible to our quite alien twentieth century minds;

⁶ *Pistis Sophia. Ein Gnostisches Originalwerk*, Leipzig, 1925. An earlier edition appeared in 1905.

⁷ *Pistis Sophia ouvrage gnostique de Valentin*, Paris, 1895.

⁸ In his *Album de Paléographie Copte*; this dating is based solely on the uncertain grounds of palæography.

⁹ *Über das gnostische Buch Pistis Sophia*, Leipzig, 1891.

¹⁰ J. R. Harris, *Odes and Psalms of Solomon*, ed. of 1920, p. 117, thinks it is an original Coptic work; with which F. C. Burkitt, JTS, April, 1921, and Jan., 1926, has agreed; F. Granger, JTS, vol. v (1904), pp. 400 sqq., said that he saw no reason against this view. Modern scholarship is, however, practically unanimous in regarding it as a translation from the Greek.

¹¹ *Odae Gnosticae Salomani tributae*, Havniae, 1812. We may note that the "Odes of Solomon" were known only as they appeared in PS until J. R. Harris' discovery of the Syriac text.

¹² *Jour. Asiatique*, vol. ix (1847), pp. 534 sqq.

¹³ *Pistis Sophia opus gnosticum Valentino adjudicatum*, Berlin, 1851.

¹⁴ Das Gnostische System des Buches Pistis Sophia, in *Theol. Jahrbücher*, vol. xiii (1854), pp. 1-104, 137-196.

¹⁵ In DCB, vol. iv, pp. 405-415; an excellent description of the contents of PS.

¹⁶ *Pistis Sophia. A Gnostic Miscellany*, London, 1921. A first edition was published in 1896. G. R. S. Mead as a Theosophist writes appreciatively. His work has a good annotated bibliography of earlier literature; it is translated from Schwartz's Latin, with reference to Amélineau's French and Schmidt's German.

¹⁷ *Pistis Sophia. Literally translated from the Coptic*. With an Introduction by F. Legge, London, 1924. The translation is so literal that it is wholly unreadable.

we still lack a good English translation, Schmidt's German being by far the best that we have.

We cannot say with positiveness from what Gnostic school it came; some have assigned it rather loosely to the Ophites, *e.g.*, King,¹⁸ but we know very little of the characteristics of Ophitism. Amélineau, following most of the earlier students, has assigned it to Valentinus or to one of his disciples. F. Legge is the only recent student who still holds this view. E. De Faye¹⁹ thinks it emanates from a distinct sect. Schmidt and Harnack attribute it to the group which S. Irenaeus (1:29) terms "Barbelo-Gnostics," of the sub-division which Schmidt calls "Severians," which was of encratite tendencies. This latter group was of Syrian origin, while the book before us contains many indications of an Egyptian source, the purpose generally being the same as that of the "Book of the Dead"; so we are led to conclude that, if it came from Syria first, it had undergone very considerable modifications in Egypt.²⁰ At the same time this explanation might account for some of its difficulties on the supposition that the Coptic scribe did not wholly understand the original which he was copying.²¹

In nature it is a collection of miscellanies, something like Clement's *Stromateis*, though the comparison cannot be pressed, as this, for one thing, is not the work of a single

¹⁸ *The Gnostics and their Remains*, 2d ed., London, 1887.

¹⁹ *Gnostiques et Gnosticisme*, Paris, 1925. See p. 271, "La famille gnostique dont ils sont issus n'est à confondre avec aucune autre. Elle a sa physionomie propre."

²⁰ Mead, *op. cit.*, p. xxviii, "the clearly Egyptian elements are not the more numerous; moreover, they do not seem to be the most fundamental, but are blended with, or rather superimposed upon, others which clearly did not originate in Egypt." Maspero and Lieblein think it could only have been written by persons intimately acquainted with the old Egyptian religion. Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 11, "it is an imported Gnosticism developed on an Egyptian soil."

²¹ Schmidt, *Gnostische Schriften*, etc., p. 345, "Auch wird man nicht ohne weiteres die Vermutung, welche sich unwillkürlich aufdrängt, dass nämlich der koptische Übersetzer den griechischen Text zuweilen nicht richtig verstanden und wiedergegeben habe, in Abrede stellen können, zumal da sich die abgerundeten griechischen Perioden nur schwer in die mangelhafte Form der koptischen Syntax einfügen lassen und den Übersetzer nötigen, dieselben in parataktische Sätze aufzulösen."

author; rather we may think of it as a series of extracts from the literature of some Gnostic body. It falls into four distinct sections.²² The first has no title. The second is named "The Second Book of Pistis Sophia," from which the whole book has received a title which does not properly belong to it; Schmidt regards this as the addition of a later hand and finds the real title at the close of this section, "A Portion of the Books of the Saviour." In the middle of this section there is interpolated the fragmentary conclusion of a work on the "Mystery of the Ineffable," which comprises the brief third division, containing only two pages. The fourth division is quite distinct from the rest; Schmidt regards it as the conclusion of an apocryphal Gospel, originating somewhat earlier than the rest of the work. The first three divisions, forming a more or less closely connected whole, may be divided into two parts: the first of these, treating of the fall of PS, the daughter of Barbelo, and her restoration through the thirteen æons to her original place, may be regarded as symbolizing the way of purification for mankind through penance; the second contains a number of questions addressed by some of the disciples to Christ and His answers. Here Mary Magdalene plays the most prominent part, asking thirty-nine of forty-six questions; the identification of this part with the "Little Questions of Mary" (Epiph. 26:8) is accepted by several of the students of the work. It is noteworthy that Peter holds the lowest place of all; this may arise from a controversy over the position of women in the ministry. The Mother of our Lord also occupies a minor position, being mentioned only four times, though always with honor. Eight Apostles are named, four women, Salome and Martha, in addition to the other two; these twelve apparently compose the entire group. The questions are concerned with mysteries, especially the fate of the soul after death, which were not to

²² Legge, in Horner, p. xiv, says six divisions, "only the first two of which are directly connected, or can be taken as necessarily intended to be read consecutively."

be revealed to the uninitiated; here we have one of the first principles of Gnosticism. These questions were put and the answers given during the eleven years after the Resurrection, while Christ remained among the chosen inner group of His followers. In the twelfth year He ascended to heaven but, seeing the distress of His disciples, came to earth again the next day in great glory to assure them once more before His final ascension.

There is a large borrowing of Christian elements and of Biblical language; in regard for the Old Testament PS rises above the common Gnostic view and, even more than Gnosticism generally, it is concerned with the redemption of souls.²³ Christ is rather *σωτήρ* in their thought than *κύριος*. Yet this redemption is, after all, the result of magic, not of faith, or of grace, or of morality; these elements are present, but they are not primary. If one dies possessed of the proper "pass-word" and, finding himself in the place of torment, pronounces this word, immediately the gates fly open for his deliverance.

The effect of the whole does not serve to increase our understanding of Gnosticism, or to bring it any nearer orthodox standards; rather our faith in the fidelity of the picture drawn by the Fathers of the second and third centuries is confirmed. Along with the Christian element there is a still larger element of mystery, which Christianity cannot assimilate and make in any way its own. Part of this mystery is expressed in the childish fashion of concocting names made up of long strings of vowels, less frequently consonants, in unpronounceable combinations. "These are the names which I will give of the Infinite. Write them with a sign that the sons of God may be

²³ De Faye, *op. cit.*, p. 299, "D'un bout à l'autre, il a été question de la rédemption des âmes. Livre mal composé, plein de digressions et de répétitions interminables, monotone et fastidieux. Il ne laisse pas, cependant, d'avoir une certaine unité. Le lien qui rassemble cette masse incohérente en un seul faisceau, c'est la pensée du salut des âmes. Voilà l'inspiration vraie de l'auteur. Si médiocre que soit son oeuvre, elle lui communique une élévation et une générosité de sentiments qui rachètent bien des défauts."

hereby manifest. This is the name of the Immortal One, AAA, $\omega\omega\omega$. And this is the name of the Voice whereby the perfect Man has been moved, III. And this is the interpretation of the name of this Mystery: the first which is AAA, its interpretation is $\phi\phi\phi$; the second which is MMM or $\omega\omega\omega$, its interpretation is AAA; the third which is $\psi\psi\psi$, its interpretation is 000; the fourth which is $\phi\phi\phi$, its interpretation is NNN; the fifth which is $\Delta\Delta\Delta$, its interpretation is AAA. He who is on the throne is AAA: this is the interpretation of the second; AAAA, AAAA, AAAA; this is the interpretation of the whole name." Another example, from the opening of the final part: "Then Jesus stood with His disciples by the water of the Ocean and pronounced this prayer, saying: 'Hear Me My Father, Thou Father of all fatherhood, endless light, aeiouo iao, aoi, oia, psinother, thernops, nopsither, zagoure, pagoure, nethmomaoth, nepsiomaoth, marachachtha, thobarrabau, tharnachachan, zorokothora, ieou, sabaoth.'" The attempts which have been made to derive these combinations of letters from words of other languages, Hebrew, Aramaic, Egyptian, Persian, etc., are not at all convincing, though some of them may be easily identified, as Sabaoth. Beside what we have here the magical system of the ancient Egyptians is intelligibility itself. It should be noticed, however, that the moral teaching is high, and that the practice of virtue generally is enjoined in the most forceful language, also that the foul practices of some of the Gnostic sects are condemned here quite as strongly as by the Fathers of the early Church.

The Books of Jeû.—These two emanated from the same group as PS²⁴ and were, apparently, somewhat earlier; PS alludes to them in several places²⁵ as the "lower mysteries described in the Book of Jeû." Schmidt dates the Coptic version of one in the fifth century, of the other in the fifth or

²⁴ Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 371, "Die Differenzen, welche man leicht durch eine Vergleichung beider Systeme gewinnen kann, sind nicht derartiger Natur, dass die Bücher zwei verschiedenen Verfassern zugeschrieben werden müssten."

²⁵ Though Preuschen and Liechtenhan have rejected the identification of these books with those mentioned in PS it is generally accepted.

sixth; the Greek originals going back to the middle of the third century in the case of the first book, to the last quarter of the second in the case of the second book. Together, as we have them, they form the Codex Brucianus, brought from Egypt in the eighteenth century by the Scotch traveller James Bruce, and acquired by the Bodleian Library in 1842.

This Codex also was copied by Woide, he being the first to call attention to it. Schwartze had purposed an edition, but death prevented. Amélineau was the first to publish some short extracts²⁶ and, finally, a complete edition,²⁷ in which he expressed the opinion that they represented an early stage in the teaching of Valentinus, and were originally composed between 130-140 A.D. Dr. Carl Schmidt, after a severe criticism of Amélineau's work,²⁸ produced a splendid edition,²⁹ with German translation and copious notes. The task of editing the text was a difficult one; the leaves were entirely disarranged, and were also so badly mutilated that several long gaps were irreparable.

The First Book is headed by what appears to be a motto: "I have loved you and wished to give you life. Jesus the living is the knowledge of truth." It then continues to what seems to be the title: "This is the Book of the Knowledge of the Invisible God by means of the occult mysteries." At the beginning the Chrisitan element is more conspicuous than the Gnostic; then, after a long break in the manuscript, comes an account of the sixty emanations of Jeû; of these only twenty-eight remain—but they are quite enough. The general character is the same as PS, but here each of the emanations is illustrated by a diagram, showing its "mark," its "name," its "guardians," and its "emanations." Next, after another

²⁶ *Annales du Musée Guimet*, vol. xiv, pp. 249 sqq.; *Rev. de l'hist. des religions*, vol. xxi, pp. 175 sqq.

²⁷ *Notices et Extraits des Mss. de la Bibl. Natl. et autres Bibliothèques*, vol. xxix, pt. 1.

²⁸ *Göttingen gelehrte Anzeigen*, no. 17 (1891), no. 6 (1892).

²⁹ *Gnostische Schriften in Koptischer Sprache aus dem Codex Brucianus*, Leipzig, 1892.

lengthy break, is an account of the journey of Christ, accompanied by His disciples, through the sixty "Treasures," of which the mutilated manuscript contains only seven. Then there follows a hymn to the "unapproachable God," full of mysterious names and strings of letters in combinations meaningless to us. At the end are the words: "The Book of the great κατὰ μυστήριον λόγος," which Schmidt regards as the title of the whole.

Second Book of Jeû.—This is most closely related to PS and is, according to Schmidt, the earliest of all, belonging to the last quarter of the second century or, at the latest, to the opening years of the third. The scene is laid in Judea; Christ is represented in the twelfth year after His Resurrection as imparting to the twelve disciples the greater mysteries, which had hitherto been withheld from men. These mysteries will bring those who faithfully accept them ultimately to the "Treasure of Light." On man's part the condition is renunciation of all worldly affections and interests; but, at the same time, he must possess the mystic knowledge of the initiate, the proper "pass-words." This brings us close to the old Pharaonic religion, the condition being much the same as that imposed in the "Book of the Dead" and in "The Book of the Opening of the Mouth." The initiate are also to pass through three baptisms, that by water, by fire, and by the Holy Ghost, and to receive the mystery of spiritual unction. These are much like those described in the last book of PS, and are probably based upon S. Mt. 3:11-12 rather than S. Mt. 28:19. Harnack thinks the sacramental conceptions here shown are in advance of those of the "Great Church" and were adopted by it;³⁰ but, in addition to the improbability of the Catholic Church borrowing from the Gnostics, against whom it waged its chief warfare in the second and third centuries, is the fact that equally advanced sacramental teaching is already found in Catholic writings antedating or

³⁰ Schmidt also, *op. cit.*, p. 526, "Solche Gedanken findet man in dieser Zeit noch keineswegs in der Grosskirche; man müsste denn zu dem berühmten Heilmittel der disciplina arcana seine Zuflucht nehmen.

contemporary with these works. The baptisms are described in some detail and are, essentially, the practice of the contemporary Church in administering Baptism and Confirmation, with the addition of considerable mystic symbolism, and with the borrowing of elements from the Eucharist, pointing, perhaps, to the First Communion, with which the combined services ended. This view dispenses with the difficult theory of Köstlin that all is related to the Eucharist. One other mystery, that of the pardon of sins, remains to be received; perhaps this was contained in the final part of the book, which is now missing.

The first book is more theoretical, describing the world beyond; the second gives the means whereby this world is to be reached.

Fragments.—Appended to the books are two fragmentary prayers and a short fragment of a treatise, all closely connected with the school which produced PS and the two Books of Jeû. They are so badly disarranged and mutilated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make anything of them; but they contain an even larger element of magic. Setheus takes the place of Jeû. In date they seem to be contemporary with second Jeû and, consequently, belong to the earliest period.

Other Works.—To be added to the above literature are the works contained in a Coptic papyrus of the fifth (?) century, acquired by the Egyptian Museum in Berlin in 1896.³¹ This contains a "Gospel according to Mary," bearing the subtitle "A Revelation of John," and consisting chiefly of revelations to S. John; a "Wisdom of Jesus Christ," containing teaching imparted after His Resurrection; and "Acts of Peter," telling the story of a miraculous healing of his own daughter. The first of these seems to have been known to and used by S. Irenaeus (I:29) in his description of the Barbelo-Gnostics.

³¹ Schmidt, Ein vorirenäisches gnostisches Originalwerk in koptischer Sprache, in *Sitz. d. Kgl. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissensch.*, Berlin, 1896, pp. 839-847; Irenaeus und seine Quelle in Adv. Haer. I: 29, in *Philotesia*, Paul Kleinert zum LXX Geburtstag dargebracht von A. Harnack, u.s.w., Berlin, 1907, pp. 317-336. See also Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxvi-xxxviii.

CATHOLIC CHRISTOLOGY GRANDLY VINDICATED

By FRANCIS J. HALL, Miami, Florida

Father Thornton has produced one of the outstanding books of our time.¹ It has been called forth by the confusion into which Christian Theism, Christology and Trinitarianism have been momentarily thrown in scholarly circles by modernists, unintentionally aided by sympathetic and clever, rather than securely established, orthodox apologists. The equipment revealed in this book includes an exceptionally comprehensive theological background, a discerning apprehension of the values and bearings of modern scientific and critical theories, and constructive genius. The author sees things whole, and therefore can put new knowledge in its proper perspectives.

The book is difficult for two reasons. In the first place, its particular apologetical reference required resort to technicalities of recent speculative origin which are not yet widely assimilated; and secondly, the writer treats his subject with elaborate detail, touching on many incidental problems, his arguments advancing like a great stream, with many backward eddies attending the general onward flow. For wider benefit the main substance of his argument needs to be presented in a less technical and simpler book. But in its present form it runs true with the complex interrelations of detail which emerge when the central truths of religion are used for adequately interpreting circumferential knowledge. The labour of mastering the book is unusually worth while, and no one who wishes to understand the case for Catholic doctrine in relation to current science and philosophy should fail to obtain it *and to study it carefully*.

¹ *The Incarnate Lord: An Essay Concerning the Doctrine of the Incarnation in its Relations to Organic Conceptions.* By Lionel Spencer Thornton, M.A., of the Community of the Resurrection. London, New York, etc., Longmans, Green & Co., 1928; 8vo, pp. xxxvi + 490. Price \$7.50.

In this article, I am seeking to give a very broad sketch of his main argument. It will necessarily ignore important details, and will unavoidably reflect my own reactions. But I hope, none the less, to give an outline which will not misrepresent the argument.

I. THE GENERAL ARGUMENT

Our author undertakes to show that, so far from the latest scientific developments being contrary to Catholic Christology and Trinitarianism, they are affording materials for a more mature exposition thereof. And by means of such exposition they help us to place Theism, or belief in the supreme and personal God, in the larger perspective of truth in which its validity and manifold bearings are most fully and convincingly apparent.

The book has two parts. The first, entitled "The Domains of Experience and the New Creation," taking evolutionary science for granted, utilizes the organic theory of Whitehead and others to show that the whole cosmic process, with its rising series of organisms, has an eternal background, the operative inflows of which explain the series as a whole and each successive level attained by it. This process cannot *of itself* attain its goal, but prepares the way for the appropriation of its highest product, the human organism, by very God. This appropriation, the Incarnation, issues in a new creation—in an organism through man's mystical union with which the whole cosmic series, recapitulated in man, is enabled to attain its divinely appointed and super-human end.

The second part, "The Incarnation and Christian Theism," carries on the argument in an illuminating exposition of the transition from the old to the new creation, in the light of Catholic Christology, Pneumatology and their Trinitarian background. Finally the working of the new creation is described as accomplished in the social organism of the Church, the Mystical Body of God-Incarnate.

These two parts, however, overlap; and the reader is carried

back and forth for the fuller elucidation of successive stages. But so it is in life. The divine drama moves steadily on, but in each intermediate act the past is recapitulated and the future is foreshadowed. The stages of advance are distinct, but are not independent. The whole controls, and is reflected in, each stage, and the meaning of each lies in its relation and subservience to the whole.

II. THE ORGANIC SERIES

Returning to fuller consideration of the first part of the book, after reviewing the recent escape of expert scientists from the dualism and mechanical interpretation of evolution which prevailed in the nineteenth century, the author emphasizes the centrality of time and history in any true synthesis of reality.

To-day it is perceived that the cosmos reveals the several grades of matter, life, mind and spirit, which are so many critical stages in the development of an interconnected series of organisms. "Organism" is not here, has widely ceased to be, used in an exclusively biological sense. It is "a whole which pervades its parts and expresses its own law of unity through them. The parts have their own modes of unity and laws of being, their own cycles of events, their own sequences of change—in short they exhibit characteristics which belong to their respective levels in the cosmic series. These characteristics are taken up into the unity of the whole . . . within the whole under transformed conditions, and so subserve its higher functions." Thus the term "organic" has been extended downward from biology into the field of physical science and upwards into that of mind and spirit.

At each stage in the building up of the series there has emerged a *transformation*, or union of parts previously developed under new conditions; and each new organism thus emerging becomes the centre of inflow and outflow—horizontally in relation to cosmic environment, and perpendicularly within the developing series itself. No entity is isolated,

and the lower stages are not superseded in the higher ones. But, while retaining their own laws, they subserve the law of the higher organism in each case.

In relation to earlier organisms thus recapitulated and reconditioned within itself, each successive higher organism is perceived to possess a new and controlling element, a higher law of unity. And this is not derived from the lower or recapitulated organisms, but is gained by an inflow from an *eternal background*. In other words, the development at every stage is *creative*, involving both a *revelation* of purposeful trend and an appropriate organic *response* thereto. Admitting that Theism cannot be formally demonstrated, it seems clear that no other hypothesis so adequately explains this cosmic development.

The highest possibilities of the organic series are reached at the human level. At this level every previous grade is recapitulated. None is superseded or nullified. But with the lower elements mind and spirit are combined in one organism, having its law of unity at the level of spirit. The higher elements and functions of this organism are indeed conditioned by those of lower organic stages. But there is no dualism, for all elements pertain to one organism, and in that organism subserve a law of unity and functioning derived from the eternal background.

III. INDIVIDUALITY

The unique significance of the human and spiritual level is closely connected with the emergence therein of self-conscious *individuality*, capable, on the one hand, of apprehending and theistically interpreting the revelation which the organic series progressively makes of its eternal background; and, on the other hand, of conscious response in adoring and self-surrendering worship, this double capacity being conditioned by that dependence upon divine aid which true worship expresses. At the lower levels individuality was strictly subservient to the several species, and to the development of

the series as a whole, without capacity to transcend its own organism. But its significance grows with the development of higher species, reaching its organic climax at the spiritual level of man. At this level the individual becomes aware of self as individual, and by response to the eternal transcends self.

But he is not independent of the other members of his species. They constitute a social organism, coördination with which conditions his individual functioning and self-transcendence. In other words, there is tension—counteraction between the individual and the social organism. But only through the individual can the highest human functions of apprehension of, and response to, the eternal be actualized; and this apprehension and response is central to the purpose of creation, is the terminus of such fulfilment as is possible within the purely organic. In man biological evolution reaches its highest possible stage.

In him individuality and actuality are concentrated and brought to focus. In the latest terminology, they are most concrete. In the human individual, however, this concretion is neither complete nor self-sufficing; but is relative to, and dependent for completion upon, the higher and truly absolute concreteness and self-existing actuality which for the first time is apprehended in the eternal background, and consciously responded to, at the human level. This actuality is God, whose individuality is absolute, self-sufficing, and unconditioned, the perfectly actualized concrete.

In harmony with all this, there emerges in human individuals, as their most significant law, the religious element, an aspiration after full relations with God; and in such relations lies the final purpose of creation. Man is made for God, and finds no completion except in union with Him. But God is infinitely super-organic; so that this God-imparted aspiration cannot be fulfilled unless the organic is supplemented by the fullest of inflows from above, that is, by the entrance of God Himself into human history.

Moreover, the human race is handicapped by the ethical failure, by sin; and union with God is impossible without the removal of this hindrance. But no resources are available at the organic level for such consummation. Accordingly, the entrance of God into history, if its purpose is to be fulfilled, has to issue in an act of divine redemption, and in a dispensation of saving grace thereby made possible.

Thus occurs a *new creation*, transcending the old, but not by any change of plan, nor by subversion of the organic. The eternal order, immanent though it be in the organic series throughout its development, transcends the organic order. In conventional terms, it is supernatural, and remains so in the new creation. It indeed supplies therein a new control, a new law of unity, but it does not supersede the organic, as recapitulated in its various grades in the human organism. And there is no breaking down of the abiding and ineffaceable difference between the two orders; although in the Incarnate Lord they are centred in one Individuality, in "Absolute Individuality as it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word."

IV. RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

In the last statement I have crossed the boundary between the first and second Parts of the volume; but before going on with the second Part it is desirable to return and deal with the human experience by which men were first prepared for the revelation of the Incarnate Lord, and then were enabled to interpret it.

It is at the human level of the organic series that religious experience first emerges. Man becomes aware of himself as transcending change and succession, as related to the eternal. He apprehends the cosmic order in which he has emerged, and utilizes it with coherent purpose. Under these conditions, and within this framework, he apprehends the eternal order, as at once immanent in and transcending the concrete environment wherein it is manifested. Religion, or the cultivation of relations with the eternal, is born. It is rooted

in human nature, but in development is linked with other human experience, and its eternal Object is interpreted in the terms of human social relations. Their complexities until properly coördinated produce polytheism, which is emerged from gradually.

Only in Israel, however, was the general rational advance centred in religion; and only there did the essence of religion, or communion with God as transcendent yet concrete individuality, clearly emerge. The rationalization of religion by Israel was in terms of concrete activity, tending towards Absolute Actuality. Attended by incidental and crude anthropomorphism, there was an ethical trend in the conception of God gradually resulting in definite monotheism. But along with the consequent emphasis on divine transcendence, there developed intimate religious relations, and belief that God is not only transcendent King, but in His Kingdom is Redeemer and Saviour of His people. All this development was conditioned and promoted by law, by sacrificial institutions and by prophecy. But the development could not reach its goal under Old Testament conditions. The tension of contrast between the Holy God and sinful creatures was unresolved. So the Jew concentrated upon legalistic routine and apocalyptic hope of divine intervention. He could get no further.

The fulness of time had come, and Jesus appeared as the Christ of the Messianic hope. He was not personally a product of history, nor of organic evolution. His birth was not a case of propagation of the species. He entered from beyond, as having descended out of Heaven; and He focused the Kingdom of God ethically and governmentally in His own Person, transforming it into the Fellowship of the Spirit. His life-story became the Gospel, and paramount for those who believed in Him. In it, as completed by His redemptive death and resurrection, the tension between God and man was perceived to be resolved. This perception was progressively developed in the Fellowship of the Spirit, the Church, by

experience of saving grace derived from Christ, and of union with Him. Moreover, the absolute quality of this experience was explained by the finality of Christ's redeeming action in history. Out of reflection, based upon these premises, grew apostolic and Catholic Christology, with its trinitarian background.

V. THE INCARNATION

The event at Bethlehem is not explained by any possibilities within the rising series of organisms hitherto considered, but does not break the continuity of the larger plan of God. The ascent of the organic series has been explained as due to progressive incorporation from the eternal background, culminating in the emergence of concrete individuality. This individuality apprehends the eternal background theistically, but is still unable fully to complete the aspiring response to which the spiritual law of its organism moves it. This response requires full communion with absolute individuality, with God, in whose image man is made. The ascending movement has exhausted the possibilities of the organic series, but is still incomplete.

Accordingly, in the fulness of time, God, in the Person of the eternal Word, incorporates His very self into a human organism, "taking the Manhood into God," and thus enabling it to attain its destiny. As has been stated, the Person thus incorporating Himself is not a product of the evolution of the organic series, but is the Creator of that series, completing the mystery of partial and operative incorporation therein by making the human organism His own. There is no breach of continuity, for the organism thus assumed retains its organic law, and none of the laws of lower levels recapitulated therein is superseded or subverted. What happens is the incorporation of a new control, involving the effective relating of all elements and functions of the human organism to the super-organic level of deity in God-Incarnate. "The Incarnation means that *Absolute Actuality as it exists in the Person of the Eternal Word becomes the principle of unity in a human*

organism." Thus is achieved, as will appear, the initial event in the establishment of the new creation, which enables human individuals to rise to God through incorporation into that organism of Christ.

In the human life-story of the Incarnate Lord, the proper perfections of each level in the organic series and in human growth are found, but transformed. And this transformation not only recapitulates the transformations attending previous advances within the organic series, but reveals a super-human principle of unity by which the human organism is made to subserve super-organic reference and direction. Thus, while the Incarnate Lord is not an organism, He becomes organic to man and to the universe. He identifies Himself with man in exhibiting submission to God, although with two notable differences: His sinless perfection; and His relation to the eternal order, as in full possession of it and of its outlook. Moreover, His sympathy, although humanly conditioned and shown, is *based* upon His eternal outlook and not upon community with imperfection.

VI. THE PERSON OF CHRIST

The Christology of the apostolic Church, so far as then articulated, and of the patristic age, runs true with its experiential beginning. It becomes increasingly definitive, but is wholly implicit in the pentecostal reaction of the apostolic mind towards Him whom they describe in prayer to the Father as "Thy Holy Child Jesus." This appears in the fact that, although mindful of the human nature of Christ, the first generation of Christians consistently assumed an attitude toward Him which could be justified only by that estimate of His Person which slowly gained expression in Catholic Creed and conciliar definition.

The technical terms employed in resulting definitions had to be borrowed from alien metaphysical sources; for no others were available for meeting the metaphysically expressed errors which the Church sought to exclude. In their previous

use and context these terms were certainly unsuitable for the Church's purpose. But in the process of their appropriation they were made over, so to speak, were assimilated to a new context altogether, and in that context acquired meanings consistent with their use—not to explain, a purpose foreign to the Church's dogmatic office, but—to define the particulars of traditional doctrine concerning Christ's Person as against erroneous interpretations. This was necessary because the heresies thus met were seen to have practical bearings, subversive of Christianity.

Modernists condemn Chalcedonian Christology as expressed in an out-of-date terminology, no longer intelligible. No doubt, if the ancient Church had been confronted by the terminology and thought-forms of to-day, it would have used them in defining the traditional doctrine, that is, very different ones from those actually employed. But the terms which it did employ were then effective for shutting out the errors which it had in view, and are still both intelligible and effective for those who loyally investigate their meaning in their ecclesiastically adopted context. And even untrained believers when using the Nicene Creed do not fail, because of their inability to explain the terms employed, to be fortified in the Faith therein symbolized. As Father Thornton truly says, "The argument, that because Greek metaphysics has passed away, therefore the doctrines which the Church clothed in the garb of that metaphysical system have ceased to be significant, is a glaring *non sequitur*."

I may not take the space needed to exhibit our author's discussion of ancient Christological developments in detail. I can only say summarily that he selects the two poles of error, Adoptionism and Monophysitism; and shows, on the one hand, that Adoptionism, by including Christ in the organic series, makes His divinity adjectival only, makes Him unequal to the mediatorial achievement of redemption. On the other hand, he shows that Monophysitism supersedes the human, and thus excludes the attainment by the human of its goal in God.

In the divine plan no level of the advancing series is superseded, but each is transformed in relation and function. So in Christ the human retains its integrity while given a new centre of unity, viz. the Absolute Individuality of the Eternal Word.

VII. THE HOLY SPIRIT

The course of development of trinitarian theology in the ancient Church was practically determined by the successive heresies which required correction; and as these were chiefly concerned with the Person of Christ, the Person of the Spirit and His place in the Trinity received little attention until Arianism begat the Macedonian denial of His Godhead.

But it is not true that a binitarian conception of God, as subsisting in two Persons only, the Father and the Son, gained acceptance. The trinitarian formula of Baptism furnished the controlling background of orthodox thought, and is reflected in the most seductive trinitarian heresy of the third and fourth centuries, *i.e.* Sabellianism. This heresy was concerned with a triad in God—not a duad. The place of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity is also taken for granted in orthodox replies to Sabellianism, and pioneer efforts to define it were made by Origen and Tertullian. When the Macedonian heresy brought the doctrine of the Spirit to the fore, it became clear that in orthodox circles the vindication of Christ's Person was considered to carry with it an acceptance of the personality and Godhead of the Spirit. His coördination with the Father and the Son in the Nicene Creed, at all events, is inconsistent with denial of either of these two affirmations.

Father Thornton discusses at some length the alleged identification of the Spirit with Christ by St. Paul (2 Cor. iii. 17), which does not agree with that writer's frequent distinction of Their functions. "Whereas Christ is the organic Head of the new community, the Spirit is its bond of unity and fellowship. He is the effective cause of that organic unity which it derives from Christ." Two kinds of creative activity emerge, one transcendent and formative and referred to Christ,

the other immanent and quickening and referred to the Spirit. This does not imply either a denial that the Spirit is a Person or is transcendent. He may be called "the *alter ego*" of the Son. Alas, I am giving only the slightest indication of the richness of Father Thornton's treatment of the Holy Spirit.

VIII. THE TRINITY

The trinitarian doctrine of God cannot be proved by reason; but, once revealed, can be seen to agree with the implications of human individuality and its relations to the eternal in religious self-transcendence. It explains religious experience better than any rival hypothesis.

Human individuality is finite, and within the organic series cannot fulfil its highest law by complete communion with deity—a failure accentuated by ethical disharmony. Yet it is what it is as receptacle of the as yet fullest, and therefore most revealing inflow from the Absolute Individuality of God. This inflow, and the requirements of the communion with God towards which the human individual is driven to aspire, justify belief in a certain analogy between divine and human individuality. And the social aspect of the latter has to be kept in view, as apparently essential to individual functions *in se*. This analogy can rightly be pressed if we allow for the ineffaceable difference between finite and infinite, between the organic series and the eternal order.

The revelation of the Trinity is thus perceived to answer to the implications of human individuality, considered as receptacle of divine self-giving; and in all our knowledge individuality is inseparable from plurality. But two possible errors of interpretation perpetually attend trinitarian doctrine. The first of these is *Modalism*, which violates the analogy above indicated by refusing to reckon with the element of plurality always found in individuality. Moreover, to reduce the divine Persons to mere modes of one Person reduces the self-sufficiency of God's Absolute Individuality: (a) by precluding any self-giving within the Godhead; (b) by making God de-

pendent upon creation for self-expression; (c) by making divine love extrinsic to the divine essence.

The other error is *Tritheism*, liable to be inferred from the analogy here employed, but justly so only when it is treated as adequate. The limitations of the organic level have to be allowed for. Organic plurality involves externality in space and time; and the increasing internality of human individuals brings their advancing differentiation. But, on the other hand, the real significance of the human social organism lies in the movement to transcend pluralities of the organic level by relations of function and vocation controlled by the eternal order.

That is, the analogy has to be supplemented by the principle of interpenetration, actualized by that self-transcendence of finite individuality which is made possible through God's entire self-giving in the Incarnation. The doctrine of the Trinity requires belief that the divine Persons exist in each other—they *coinhere* both in the essence of Absolute Individuality, and in the operations of creation, redemption and sanctification, in which we are related severally to each. The divine Persons are perfectly individual because mutually inherent. "God is *Three Persons in One Absolute Individuality*, or *Three Personal Centres of One Absolute Actuality*."

For this mystery no human terms can be adequate, and the term "*Person*" is inadequate. None the less, it is a "sound word," because it guides our apprehensions in the right direction. "It has acquired a precise technical meaning in the history of doctrine," and "we cannot afford to dispense with the historical associations and delicate balance of theological meanings which have crystallised round the word in connection with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation." It can and should be distinguished from "*personality*," a term which, when applied in modern use to God, is apt to have either Unitarian or tritheistic implications.

Father Thornton wisely prefers *individuality* for two reasons. In the first place, in wider reference its principle, as here

defined, "runs through the whole structure of creation" and "throughout the organic series . . . includes plurality within itself." Secondly, therefore, "the word . . . has also a narrower reference; for it need not mean a single self or centre of personality," as it does in the organic series. It does not, of course, mean this in the concreteness of Absolute Individuality or in God. "Thus the phrase Three Persons in One Absolute Individuality appears to strike the right balance."

IX. THE CONSUMMATION

The human organism, on the one hand, recapitulates the whole creation, the whole organic series of which it is the term and crown. Man is the microcosm, and, on the other hand, he is being completed in a new creation for the super-organic consummation of full communion with his Maker. This is the destiny set before him, one in which nothing is superseded but all creation in its several relations in him is involved. The new creation is neither a product of the old nor a breach of continuity. In it God completes the partial inflows from Himself by complete self-giving, and on that basis initiates the completion of His purpose in creation, in the organic series, on a super-organic divine level.

Absolute Individuality in the Person of the eternal Logos becomes the individuality of a human organism; and through that organism, by the operation of His Holy Spirit, the Incarnate carries on the divine cosmic drama to its completion. This consummation has two stages: (a) The Incarnate Lord's earthly life-story, as Revealer, Example and Redeemer; (b) His organic activity in His Body the Church, as Saviour. In the first stage, "the Kingdom of God was incorporated into history in its ultimate individual form"; in the second "its social incorporation . . . is in process of actualization in the New Order." The Church, as I myself have ventured to describe it elsewhere, is "the machinery of the Kingdom of God." As Father Thornton improves on this description, "it is the organ of the Kingdom." On earth it leavens, gathers,

and continues the earthly ministry of the Incarnate Lord; and it is the inception of that divine communion and fellowship, or eternal life, which is the purpose of creation, and is consummated when the Church attains its perfection hereafter.

I hope that my readers will not consider that my outline of Father Thornton's book can do duty for the book itself. I have had to ignore many significant details, and have not been able adequately to exhibit the combination of argumentative strength and vast outlook which characterize the book. My article is only an imperfect introduction, the aim of which is to induce as many as possible to study the treatise itself. It will open up many lines of profitable thought and meditation, and will make clear *the meaning and fruitful value of seeing things whole.*

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

A READING COURSE

By FREDERICK C. GRANT, Western Theological Seminary

The full 'History of Christian Thought' would include—or at least involve—almost the whole of the post-classical History of European Thought, certainly from the 4th century to the 18th. What is aimed at here is a survey of the general development, with particular attention to some of the leading figures and movements. The survey follows in the main the doctrinal or theological history, not because the history has been exclusively doctrinal but because (i) the chief expression of Christian thought in the past has been doctrinal: Christianity is a theological (or, as Dean Inge regards it, a 'philosophical') religion; and because (ii) Christian Thought in general has been influenced profoundly by Christian theology (as we see, *e.g.*, in Poetry—Dante, Milton, Goethe, Wordsworth, for examples—in Letters, in Art, in Philosophy, and even, until recently, in Science). But the stream of Christian Thought has not been exclusively doctrinal, and the student should try to supplement and supply the setting for these chief figures and movements from the general literary, philosophical, and scientific outlook and interests of each period. There are ten or a dozen great books which, if a man truly understands them, will give him the key to the intellectual history of the Christian religion; and perhaps eight or ten great minds who, in their summing up of their own past and present, and in their influence upon posterity, make clear that continuity and progress (or 'development') in Christian Thought which it is the aim of this survey to discover—men like Origen, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Dante, Calvin, Schleiermacher, Newman. The best we can hope, in so brief

a course as this, is to make somewhat closer acquaintance with these intellectual giants of old time.

I. *General Introduction.*

- A. B. D. Alexander, *The Thinkers of the Church* (Doran).
- A. V. G. Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*.
- "Studies in Theology" (Scribners), three vols. by Workman, McGiffert, and Moore on "Christian Thought."
- G. P. Fisher, *History of Christian Doctrine*.
- A. von Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte (Grundriss)*, with ref. to his *History of Dogma*.
- F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zur Studium der Dogmengeschichte*.
- R. Seeberg, *Textbook of the History of Doctrines*.
- J. Tixeront, *Histoire des Dogmes*. This also is translated.
- G. L. Hurst, *Outline History of Christian Literature*.

2. *Popular Christianity in the Second Century, incl. Gnosticism, and the beginnings of Christian speculative thought.*

- A. von Harnack, *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, I. bk. ii.
- K. Lake, *Apostolic Fathers* (Loeb Library).
- E. F. Scott, art. Gnosticism in ERE, or
- W. Bousset, art. Gnosticism in EBr.
- E. Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity*, ch. v.
- Artt. Marcionism, Chiliasts, Montanism, in ERE.
- The Anti-Gnostic Fathers:
- Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, bks. i and v.
- Tertullian, *Apology*.
- Clement, *Exhortation*, x-xii.

3. *The Apologists.*

- Artt. Apologists, Monarchianism, in ERE.
- Justin Martyr, *Apology* (I), i-xxv, li to end.
- Tatian, *Address to the Greeks*.
- Aristides, *Apology*.
- Athenagoras, *Plea*, i-xix.
- Epistle to Diognetus*.

4. *Origen.*

- C. Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*.
- B. F. Westcott, *Religious Thought in the West*, ch. v.
- Art. Origen in EBr. Also the one in DCB.
- Artt. Neo-Platonism and Alexandrian Theology in ERE.
- Origen, *De Principiis*, esp. bk. i.
- Origen, *Contra Celsum*.

5. *Arianism and the Christological Controversy.*

Artt. Athanasius, Antiochene Theology, Cappadocian Theology, in ERE.
 Athanasius, *Incarnation of the Word*.
 Leo, *Tome* (Ep. xxviii).

6. *Augustine.*

E. Bevan, *Hellenism and Christianity*, chh. vi-vii.
 Augustine, *Confessions*, *Soliloquies*, *City of God*, esp. bks. i, xix.
 Augustine, *Encheiridion*, *De Catech. Rudibus*, *De Fide et Symbolo*, *De Utilitate Credendi*, *De Trinitate*.

7. *Scholasticism.*

B. F. Westcott, *Religious Thought in the West*, ch. iv.
 C. R. S. Harris, art. Philosophy in *The Legacy of the Middle Ages* (Oxford).
 E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*.
 M. Grabmann, *Thomas Aquinas*.
 Artt. Anselm, Aquinas, Dante, Scholasticism, in ERE.
 Anselm, *Monologium*, *Proslogium*, *Cur Deus Homo* (Open Court).
 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Th.*, i. 29, 93, 100, 105, etc.
 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*.
 P. H. Wicksteed, *Dante and Aquinas* (or, Hibbert Lects., 1916).
 Dante, *Divina Commedia*, tr. Cary (EML) or that in Temple Classics.

8. *Mysticism.*

W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*.
 Art. Mysticism in ERE.
Theologia Germanica.
 S. Winkworth, *History and Life of Rev. Dr. John Tauler*.
 E. Pfeiffer, *Meister Eckhart* (Watkins).
 W. d'Aygaliers, *Ruysbroeck the Admirable* (Dutton).
Oxford Book of Mystical Verse.

9. *The Reformation and Protestantism.*

H. Wace and C. A. Buchheim, *Luther's Primary Works*.
 J. Calvin, *Institutes*, i. 1-5, 13, 15-16; ii. 1-5; iii. 7, 19, 21; iv. 1-2, 14.
 Luther's *Catechism*, and the *Augsburg Confession*.
Westminster Catechism (Shorter and Longer).
 Artt. Calvinism, Luther, Lutheranism, in ERE.

10. *Pietism and the Aufklärung.*

Artt. Pietism, Arminianism, Kant, in ERE.
 I. Kant, *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason* (in T. K. Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, pp. 325-360).

11. *English Religious Thought to the Nineteenth Century.*

- G. P. Fisher, *History of Doctrine*, Period iv. 4, 8, 9.
 W. R. Inge, *Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought*.
 Artt. Cambridge Platonists, Puritanism, Church of England, Laud, Non-Jurors, Hooker, Butler, Wesley, Coleridge, in ERE.
 F. J. Powicke, *Cambridge Platonists*.
 J. Tulloch, *Rational Theology in England in the Seventeenth Century*.
 J. Butler, *Analogy of Religion*.
 W. Law, *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*.
 J. Wesley, *Journal* (EML).

12. *Continental Protestantism in the Nineteenth Century.*

- A. C. McGiffert, *Rise of Modern Religious Ideas*.
 Artt. Schleiermacher, Ritschlianism, in ERE.
 H. DuBois, *De Kant à Ritschl* (Neuchatel).
 F. Kattenbusch, *Die deutsche Evangelische Theologie seit Schleiermacher*.
 F. Schleiermacher, *Speeches on Religion* (Reden über die Religion).
 A. Ritschl, *Justification*, Int. and chh. iv, vi, ix.
 W. Herrmann, *Communion of the Christian with God*.

13. *English Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century.*

- C. C. J. Webb, *A Century of Anglican Theology*.
 J. Tulloch, *Religious Thought in Britain during the Nineteenth Century*.
 J. Hunt, *Religious Thought in England in the Nineteenth Century*.
 V. F. Storr, *The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century*.
 R. W. Church, *The Oxford Movement*.
 Y. Brilioth, *The Anglican Revival*.
 W. Knox, *The Catholic Movement in the Church of England*.
 Artt. Pusey, Newman, Maurice, Oxford Movement, in ERE.
 J. H. Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*.
Essays and Reviews.
Lux Mundi.
 W. Riley, *American Thought*.
 Art. Edwards and the New England Theology in ERE.
 (Also for America, chh. in Moore and Fisher.)

14. *Contemporary Religious Thought.*

- A. von Harnack, *What is Christianity?*
 A. Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*.
 G. Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Crossroads*.
 G. Tyrrell, *Mediaevalism*.
 Art. Modernism in ERE.
 A. Sabatier, *Modernism*.
 H. D. A. Major, *English Modernism*.
 F. Heiler, *Der Katholizismus*.

Contentio Veritatis.

Foundations, by Seven Oxford Men.

W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, 2 vols.; *The Church in the World*.

E. Troeltsch, *Christian Thought and Its Application*.

Essays Catholic and Critical, ed. by E. G. Selwyn.

Essays in Liberal Evangelicalism, 2 vols.

Artt. in CQR, HJ, JR, ATR, Mod. Ch'man, Theol., and other current journals.

F. von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses*, 2 vols.

A. C. Headlam, *The Church and Christian Reunion*; *The Church of England*.

W. Temple, *Mens Creatrix*; *Christus Veritas*

BOOK REVIEWS

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John. By John Henry Bernard. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, 2 vols., \$9.00.

Archbishop Bernard died two years ago, and the task of seeing the book through the press was confided to Dr. A. H. McNeile, who has ably discharged a very arduous duty.

The first impression that these two massive volumes give is that the Archbishop was little interested in the work of other commentators on St. John, and this impression is only intensified by a more thorough study. The chapter on bibliography is not only superficial but—we wish we could use a weaker term—actually ignorant of what a specialist ought to know. We are told that in the twentieth century no important commentary on the Fourth Gospel has been written, Walter Bauer's book being too small to be really outstanding—and this of a period that has produced the mammoth volumes of Zahn and Lagrange! This is a very discouraging beginning.

However Bauer's work—which outrageous typography makes seem much smaller than it really is—is a mine of information if carefully studied. But Archbishop Bernard gives no evidence of having read it through. It appears to be cited only three times and for very minor matters. Bauer's great contribution to Johannine research is his demonstration of the Gospel's place in Hellenistic and Oriental literature, and his pages are packed with parallels from the relevant sources, especially the Mandæan; of his thesis Archbishop Bernard tells us not one word. The same is true of practically every other thesis except the Archbishop's own. He almost never indulges in debate with anyone (the one real exception is the late E. A. Abbott) and when occasionally a dissenting opinion is mentioned it is generally dismissed with an abrupt "very

improbable." This of course makes for unity of treatment, but from so large and expensive a book as this the student has a right to know what the technical world in general has said and is saying.

The Archbishop's own point of view is this: The discourses in the Fourth Gospel rest on an historic basis, but as they stand they contain abundant interpretation introduced by the Evangelist. This—perfectly correct—principle is carried through systematically, even if over-cautiously. A similar interpretive element in the narrative portions, however, is denied; the narrative is normally taken to be accurate history. To this, however, there are two exceptions.

In the first place the Evangelist treated as miracles events that are really natural. The nobleman's son was not really very sick; Jesus learned the boy's symptoms from the messenger, recognized (by what special knowledge of medicine is not explained) that the illness was not serious, sent back word to the father not to worry; this was then heightened into a miracle of healing. Lazarus, perhaps, was not really dead. And so on. An element of historic fact is thus obtained—but by a rationalizing process that destroys the Evangelist's purpose in telling the miracles!

When this method fails, Archbishop Bernard has recourse to sweeping textual rearrangements. Part of the discourse in the sixth chapter is undoubtedly eucharistic; but Christ could not have described the Eucharist before its institution; therefore this section really belonged to the last chapter. The fact that this eucharistic material is in the Evangelist's mind tied up tight with the miracles in the sixth chapter we are not told.

All this is a very great pity, for there is much in the two volumes that is useful. The textual criticism—in the ordinary sense of the phrase—is careful and helpful. The exegesis proper is sober and learned, carrying on the older English traditions with dignity. But the book could easily have been so very much better!

BURTON SCOTT EASTON.

Values. A Bird's-Eye Survey. By Robert Mackintosh. London: Independent Press, 1929, pp. 131. 4s. 6d.

This little book of 120 actual pages is described by the author's sub-title as a "bird's-eye survey" of the field of values. It is the work of an intelligent and observant, but not very thorough "bird." A prefatory note disclaims any intention of dealing with the theory of value as such and limits the work to a consideration of the various values that we meet with in life. These are dealt with in brief chapters progressively under the head of the utility values or those that minister to the maintenance of life; the economic values, which arise in the process of exchange; the pleasure values, which are recognized without the acceptance of hedonism; the traditional triad of truth, beauty and goodness; and finally "the Holy" and religious values. The classification is for the most part satisfactory, excepting that the value of health might better have been dealt with in connection with life, rather than being given a separate treatment, and the social values are not very satisfactorily dealt with under the head of goodness. Goodness is something which qualifies the will in its dealings with the many values of life. Among these values with which the will deals are the social values, such as those of companionship and nationality, which are as worthy of a separate treatment as the æsthetic and economic values. The chapters are more in the nature of a series of essays than a rounded treatment. They are suggestive, but hardly adequate. They whet the appetite for a more full and rounded treatment.

ANGUS DUN.

Reinspecting Victorian Religion. By Gaius Glenn Atkins. Macmillan, 1928, pp. 151. \$1.75.

These are the Samuel Harris Lectures on Literature and Life given at Bangor Theological Seminary in 1928 by Dr. Atkins, the Professor of Homiletics in Auburn Theological Seminary. There are five, three of them interpretations of Browning and two of Tennyson.

"Cleon" by Browning furnishes the text for the chapter on "The Prophecy of the Unfulfilled"; Tennyson's "Idylls of the King," for the chapter on "The Entangled Soul"; "In Memoriam," for the chapter on "Faith and Doubt"; while Browning's "Abt Vogler" and "Ring and the Book" furnish the literary documents from which are studied "Faith Triumphant" and "Redemption," the two final chapters.

"I chose to consider two Victorian poets," says Dr. Atkins in the preface, "not altogether because they were the natural choice of a mind which I begin to suspect is Victorian, nor because they have long been preachers' poets, but because they are more deeply saturated with a feeling for the religious side of life, in a richer and more penetrating way than any other English poets, and because the finest distillation of life in literature is always found in poetry."

What he has really done is to make a five-act drama out of these chosen poems from these two matchless Victorians. It is a drama of the soul of man, beginning with the divinely prophetic and unquenchable spark of man's sense of large and eternal destiny, and closing with the splendor of redemption through sacrificial love.

He does it well, with the glow of a prophet and the fine delicate touch of the artist. Incidentally the pages abound in searching, illuminating comments upon life, and invaluable critical appraisals of literature. For example,

"We have won our humanity at the price of a tormenting self-consciousness and a haunting sense of being alien to the order to which we belong: otherwise we would not be human. We attain separateness only through knowing that we are different and we often ache with the knowledge. It is the price we pay for life."

"Edward Arlington Robinson has, I think, in *Tristram* done a finer piece of work than Tennyson in any of the *Idylls* save the first and the last."

"*The Ring and the Book* has the rich variety of an old Cathedral through whose multi-colored windows the light falls in a broken splendor of color upon aisle or high altar, and the sculptured recitative of whose front is sometimes rich in nobly carved figures, and sometimes in a kind of caprice as if the sculptor would show the abundance of his resource not in the grave beauty of kings and prophets but in the grotesque unreality of his gargoyles. Compared with *The Ring and the Book*, *In Memoriam* is a Greek Temple, perfect in the proportion of its parts and the delicacy of its lines."

We commend these chapters as ideals of what sermon-lectures on great masterpieces should be. They constitute real literature, and reinforce that high opinion of Dr. Atkins as a preacher which he established long ago in his notable pastorates in Detroit and in Providence. And, it may be added, they belong to an increasing body of literature which marks the rediscovery of Tennyson and Browning and the other giants of the popularly discredited Victorian Era.

GEO. CRAIG STEWART.

A Literary History of Religious Thought in France from the Wars of Religion down to Our Own Times. Vol. I. *Devout Humanism.* By Henri Bremond. Translated by K. L. Montgomery. New York: Macmillan, 1928, pp. xxiii + 423. \$4.50.

We are fortunate in having at last an English translation of the first volume of M. Bremond's great History. Other volumes, we believe, are ready for printing if this one is well received, and they will certainly be published if the reception even approaches the merit of the book.

This first volume deals with the religious literature of the first half of the seventeenth century, a literature to which M. Bremond gives the title of Devout Humanism. He distinguishes this from what he describes as the Christian Humanism of the preceding period: "Christian Humanism is speculative rather than practical, aristocratic rather than popular; it seeks the True and the Beautiful rather than the Holy, it addresses itself to the *élite* rather than to the crowd. These two traits distinguish it from Devout Humanism. The latter is before all else a school of personal holiness; it is undoubtedly a teaching and a theology, but effective and wholly directed towards the practical side. From another aspect, its propaganda is designed for all the faithful, even the simplest soul among them."

Of these 'devout humanists,' François de Sales is, of course, the best known. His *Traité de l'Amour de Dieu* is described as "that magnificent charter of Devout Humanism." M. Bremond gives us the key to his own philosophy of religion

in this comparison: "Newman as an observer remains haunted by care for his own soul; François forgets self in the contemplation of the Divine which he has learned to see everywhere." Religion must have its center in God and must see Him everywhere.

We are introduced to many another "devout humanist," to the lovable Jesuit, Louis Richeome, "the most notable representative of Devout Humanism before François de Sales," to Étienne Binet and Jean-Pierre Camus, the "two principal interpreters" of the Salesian spirit, to Yves de Paris, "the archetype of Devout Humanism," and to a host of others. M. Bremond is a master of the art of quotation and, in place of exhaustive and exhausting summaries, he gives us the writings of these men in a splendid mosaic of passages.

Most of us have been, at some time, under the spell of Pascal and Port Royal, and it is stimulating to read M. Bremond, whose sympathies are with the opposing camp. (He even has a kind word for poor Père Le Moyne's unfortunately named *Dévotion aisée*.) He closes this volume with this contrast between Devout Humanism and Jansenism: "Jansenism clumsily and invariably directs us to the saddest region of ourselves: fixing us in the zone of sense dominated by the law of death, where sinful flesh lies bleeding: hypnotising us before the spectacle of a natural misery of which we are not guilty and which we cannot cure. . . . Devout Humanism frees us as far as possible from this egotistic and base obsession. It invites us to forget ourselves, to lose self in the objects surrounding us, in the spectacle of the present world our kingdom, in meditation upon celestial gifts; still more by mounting to the summit of our being, inaccessible alike to the senses or to sensible devotion."

The translation, though overly literal at times, is good, and, in the frequent quotations from the religious poetry of these humanists, is remarkably fine. We look forward to the appearance of the other volumes.

W. F. WHITMAN.

The Belief of Catholics. By R. A. Knox. Harper, 1928, pp. 254. \$2.00.

The brilliancy of Father Knox is known to all. For years he was the *enfant terrible* of the Anglican ministry and when he went over to Rome (the story is told in his *Spiritual Aeneid*) he became at once a flaming apologist for the Roman position. He is a Gilbert Chesterton in Holy Orders, another Father Hugh Benson, only vastly more able and more witty. *The Belief of Catholics* is clever, sparkling, brilliant, and rather breathless. He is in a great hurry, and "if the specialist feels inclined, as doubtless he will, to button-hole me here and there with the demand for further explanation, I must offer him the discourtesy of hurrying on."

Much of what he believes—and the title really should be "What I, Ronald Knox, Believe"—and strongly defends, is what you and I and all other Anglicans believe. But when he gets to the papal question in chapter eleven, it is the same old story of twisting the New Testament account of the primitive Church into an epic of the first Pope. Indeed these are his own words: "The first twelve acts of the Apostles are a kind of epic of St. Peter." That he did not preside at the Council of Jerusalem is overlooked in favor of "in the discussion proper he speaks first," to which is added "and *perhaps* calms the doubts of his more Judaizing colleague St. James." St. Paul's withstanding of Peter face to face as one worthy of blame is referred to as "a somewhat un-Pauline rebuke," which is cancelled by the observation that Barnabas follows Peter's lead. Our Lord is represented as promising to Peter "*individually* a power of binding and loosing, which is doubtless to be shared *in some sense* by the rest of the apostles" (the italics are mine). That our Lord said to Peter, "I have prayed for thee that thy strength fail not," is—"the only record we have of our Lord offering prayer for an individual. Does not this help to define Peter's relation to his fellow-apostles?" And so on and so forth with "plenitude of apostleship" established, the occupancy by Peter of the Episcopal see of Rome assured, and parity of reasoning demanding that

"the *fact* of foundation by the Prince of the Apostles should confer a higher dignity on the two sees of Antioch and Rome," till for a "finally" we have the Antiochean bishops sharply asked why, "if they conceived that the primacy was vested with them, did they never contest the point?"

The book suffers from its brevity and from its obvious attempt to crash in and make converts in a hurry. It is, in spots, original in its way of putting old truths, and is throughout vigorous, dashing, bright, interesting, but it leaves an impression of being too clever by half; and of being the product of one in violent reaction from the Anglican position. Anglican clergy however cannot afford to pass it by. And almost anyone could read it with much profit.

GEO. CRAIG STEWART.

Christian Public Worship. Its History, Development and Ritual for Today. By Thomas L. Harris. Doubleday, Doran, 1928, pp. xvi + 259. \$2.00.

Here is another book to evidence and further the interest in the theory and practice of worship which has recently been so active both in this country and abroad. As compared with Dean Sperry's *Reality in Worship*, it is less brilliant, but more full of practical suggestions. As compared with the works of Friedrich Heiler in Germany and of Robert Will in France, it is far less complete in historical material and analysis, but obviously more available. It has special interest for Anglicans as the work of one of our own younger clergy, a student chaplain at the University of Michigan, and it is encouraging to know that so well informed and outspoken a mind is thinking about worship for our common benefit.

The 250 pages of this readable book are devoted about half and half to four chapters dealing with the history and principles of Christian worship and to a fifth chapter containing a number of suggested forms of worship with ample explanatory introductions.

The preface expounds the presuppositions on which the book is based, namely that religion begins with ritual and

lives vigorously only so long as its worship can hold men, and that traditional forms of worship are now failing in large measure to serve men's religious needs.

A long chapter on the development of Christian Public Worship offers a capable review of this development, following the accepted divisions of Church History and tracing the evolution from the Jewish and Gentile beginnings to the modern situation. The treatment is splendidly clear and honest. Though many controversial issues are dealt with in a summary way the positions taken are for the most part well supported.

The discussion of the rationale of prayer and worship finds the essence of prayer in the utterance of a wish and the essence of worship in the reverence paid to worth. The dubious suggestion is made that faith in God is not essential for either prayer or worship, though the position is softened by the explanation that the author is here seeking the minimum grounds for these practices. Though serious doubts as to the objective efficacy of prayer are expressed with appealing honesty, the practice of expressing our wishes in prayer is recommended as a procedure for the clarification and purification of desire.

This treatment concludes with an analysis of the several main forms of worship, which are divided into services of reception, in which the worshippers are primarily recipients of instruction or inspiration, services of action, in which some spiritual action on the part of the worshippers finds dramatic expression, and services of direction for specific prayer, such as litanies. This division is followed in the practical suggestions which are made regarding the practice of worship and in the many forms of service which are offered in the concluding chapter. The latter provides a number of promising suggestions for the liturgical experiments by which alone more satisfying forms of worship can be achieved.

ANGUS DUN.

Methods of Private Religious Living. By Henry Nelson Wieman. Macmillan, 1929, pp. 219. \$1.75.

By the methods set forth in this book, the author undertakes to show how religion can be made to produce definite observable results in improvement of human living. They have been tested in experience and found practicable and helpful. In 1927-28 they were sent out as a bulletin of the Institute of Sacred Literature published by the University of Chicago, and many used them as guides in personal experimental ventures of religious living. Each of the ten chapters describes a distinct method, excepting the chapter on Mysticism, where several methods are considered.

The writer himself has used them for many years and regards them as "the most precious harvest of experiences the years have brought him." The central theme is *worship*, and by worship the author means "the way we ride the winds that lift the highest."

It is not a very good book nor a very thoughtful book. For us its one serious defect is the repetitious jargon of phrases like "integrating process," "progressive integrating process," and "process of progressive integrations," on which the changes are repeatedly rung. A simple less-educated person would say "God" and have done with it. The well-trained Catholic will find that the methods set forth here are in the main the old methods of the Catholic saints whose experiences are much deeper and whose descriptions of these experiences are much more vivid, just as their analyses of them are much more simple and direct. In the chapter on Private Worship, for example, Wieman gives too large a place to introspection, self-analysis, the facing of baffling problems in the attempt to coöperate with "the constructive up-lifting, life-giving integrating process of the world," and too little to contemplation and adoration of God. In his chapter on Public Worship, or what he calls "coöperative worship," he, like so many Protestant interpreters, thoroughly subjectivizes the whole process, talking much about beauty and ritual and readings

and sermons and personal readjustments of attitude, and nothing at all of the objective worship of God as the Other, the Eternal, the Holy One high and lifted up, whose glory fills the heavens; and of course nothing at all of Jesus or of his sacramental Presence in the Mass.

In a word this is a Protestant modernist's description of his experiences along the foothills of those delectable mountains of spiritual experience up whose heights the Catholic mystics have been climbing these many centuries. That Dr. Wieman is an earnest and scholarly man no one can doubt; but a little child of Catholic up-bringing could take him by the hand and lead him through green pastures and alongside waters of comfort scarcely glimpsed by him. After all, we have to become as little children, not as Ph.D.'s, to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.

GEO. CRAIG STEWART.

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

Jesus of Nazareth. His Times, His Life, and His Teaching. By Joseph Klausner. Macmillan, 1929, pp. 434. \$2.50.

A reissue of Canon Danby's translation of Dr. Klausner's very important work upon the life of Christ. The chief value of it, for Christian readers, is the detailed and reliable presentation of the background of our Lord's life and teaching. Klausner views Jesus from the nationalistic standpoint and deprecates his non-nationalistic doctrine and ethics. One can forgive that, in a Palestinian Jew, especially since the "Christian" nations have not yet begun to put it in practice. But one can scarcely help realizing, as Klausner does most vividly, the purely spiritual non-nationalism of our Lord.

Paul and the Intellectuals. By A. T. Robertson. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1928, pp. ix + 217. \$2.00.

An exegetical and homiletical commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians. The exegesis is of course based on the Greek text and shows on every page the author's extraordinary mastery of the minutiae of the Koine language. The homiletical element in the book is rather trite. A. H. F.

Hippolytus Werke. Bd. IV. *Die Chronik.* Restored by Adolf Bauer. Ed. by Rudolf Helm, with a contribution from J. Markwart. (*Griech. Chr. Schriftsteller*, Bd. 36.) Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1929, pp. viii + 562. M. 33.

Dr. Bauer's reconstruction of Hippolytus' *Chronicle*, based in part upon the Armenian Chronicle of A.D. 686-7, and published by photostatic process directly from the MS. The amount of Greek text in the volume is not great, and one wonders if the expense of typesetting necessitated the other method. It is to be hoped that the future volumes of the series are not all to be printed photostatically. In the case of a volume like the present, which few will read or refer to, the style of printing is not a serious handicap. But the fine editions of the Fathers, which the series has provided so far, would be quite unsuitably presented in such a guise.

Luther and the Reformation. By James MacKinnon. Vol. III. *Progress of the Movement* (1521-1529). New York: Longmans, 1929, pp. xvii + 338. \$6.40.

The second volume of this work was reviewed in the ATR for October 1928. This volume, which carries the story through the Marburg Conference, has the merits, and the faults, of the preceding volumes. The difficulty of dealing, as must be done, with Luther and the Reformation in a single work becomes more apparent in this volume, for as the movement progressed it ceased to center so exclusively in Luther. Dr. MacKinnon is not as familiar with other figures of the era as he is with Luther, naturally. This fact has led him into some slight errors. Admirers of Erasmus will feel that he has been dealt with a little severely, though his *De Libero Arbitrio* is praised. The author's lack of sympathetic understanding of

Catholicism is unfortunate in a historian. (A phrase such as "the miracle of transubstantiation by priestly incantation" belongs to polemics rather than to history.)

But it is unfair to stress what are, after all, minor faults in what will certainly be the standard English biography of Luther when the fourth and last volume appears. Its great merit lies in the careful, systematic and eminently fair analysis of Luther's doctrinal development as shown in his works. W. F. W.

The Changing Family: Social and Religious Aspects of the Modern Family. By George Walter Fiske. New York: Harper, 1928, pp. xvi + 324. \$2.25.

Contemporary tendencies in family life are set forth in the first half of this readable book, but the sociological analysis is not thorough, and the exhortations intermingled are vague. Its better part, as is to be expected from a teacher of religious education, is its treatment of religion in the home and among the younger generation. Even here it has an obvious sociological limitation, as it is written from the viewpoint and to meet the problems of the suburban or smaller city middle class of Protestant church-goers. Within this group it should prove a very useful book for parents. N. B. N.

Storing Up Triple Reserves. By Roger W. Babson. Macmillan, 1929, pp. xviii + 364. \$2.00.

The thesis of this book is that "success is secured by developing financial, physical, and spiritual reserves." Accordingly there are three parts into which the work is divided. The author undertakes to give specific advice as to the acquisition of all these classes of reserves, and he is quite as positive in the spiritual as in the financial. Naturally he does not lay down rules by which any one may become a millionaire, but he offers plenty of good counsel about the necessity of saving and the wise investment of the results of thrift.

It is interesting to note the insistence on making investments in concerns which promote the world's welfare, and the statement that confidence is a vital asset for success in business. There is a sound moral tone manifest throughout the work.

Mr. Babson is seriously interested in religion and in the Church. It is gratifying to find a business man urging that "the Church as the greatest single force on the side of better living . . . has a right to the support of every good citizen." But he is not quite up to date in religious knowledge, as he assumes that all Hebrew law originated with Moses. It is sad to see the statement that "the cure for many cases of incompatibility is a physician or a psycho-analyst rather than a divorce court"; sad because he does not mention a clergyman, and yet that is properly the field for the pastor. L. W. B.

The Faith for the Faithful. By L. J. Baggott. Morehouse, 1929, pp. 272. \$2.00.

This is a series of fifteen sermon-lectures on the Creed. They were originally preached on Sunday evenings in Christ Church, Sefton Park, Liverpool. While there is nothing original in these chapters, and the author makes no claim to profound scholarship, they are clear and definite, sound in doctrine and interesting in style. Each chapter closes with a brief bibliography. We recommend it as a book of real value to preachers who are planning a course of sermons on the Creed. G. C. S.

The Riddle of Life. By Neville S. Talbot. Longmans, 1929, pp. ix + 110. \$1.00.

"The book," says the Bishop of London in his introduction, "faces and faces bravely the age-long difficulty of the existence of pain and suffering in the world." And so it does. The author modestly acknowledges that he is "haunted by a sense of presumption" as one who has exercised himself "in matters which are too high" for him, but the reader will gladly acquit him of any such charge. Dr. Talbot, who by the way is Bishop of Pretoria, has done us all a very great service. This is just the book needed not only for Lenten reading, but for great sufferers, who long for some light upon the great riddle of their own personal pain.

There is a helpful appendix on "The Fall," and another which includes four valuable letters from Baron von Hügel to whose memory this little book is "lovingly and gratefully dedicated." G. C. S.

Child Nature and Nurture. According to Nicolaus Ludvig von Zinzendorf. By Henry H. Meyer. Abingdon Press, 1928, pp. 229. \$2.50.

Dr. Meyer has here shown Zinzendorf stressing not only the free development of the child toward God, but also the large part which worship plays in the process of religious education. The way in which Zinzendorf used hymns for the teaching value of words as well as the inspiration of music might profitably be imitated by educators today. Perhaps the best part of the book is the section on Christian Nurture in the Home. Dr. Meyer has wisely stressed the efforts made by Zinzendorf to help parents in building a truly Christian type of family life. W. M. B.

Pulpit Dramas. By Phillips Endicott Osgood. Harper & Brothers, 1929, pp. xxxiii + 191. \$1.75.

Dr. Osgood's position in religious drama is already established. The present volume reveals further his picturesque genius. Its simplicity is striking and attractive. Eleven very brief plays drawn from biblical situations are here presented as substitutes for sermons and introduced by hints regarding their production in Church or parish house. From one up to four or five characters take part. The skill with which minor incidents are made vividly dramatic is remarkable. L. B.

The Catechism Today. By G. Ashton Oldham. Longmans, Green, 1929, pp. 143. \$1.00.

The Catechism in the New Prayer Book (or at least the "Offices of Instruction") contains material additional to what we were wont to find. Bishop Oldham's book has the advantage of covering this new material. Withal it is a plain and forceful exposition of the fundamental topics of the Catechism useful to clergy in catechizing and to the laity in teaching. It would do excellent service as a Confirmation manual. The author illuminates the old truth with new and interesting illustrations. The book should be a good missionary for the Church, easy to understand, practical in its application, strong in its statements. L. B.

The Growth of the World and of its Inhabitants. By H. H. Swinnerton. London: Constable, 1929, pp. 211. 5s.

A simple and clearly written introduction to geology and biology, intended for the general reader; the volume is illustrated, and should prove very useful to those for whom it is intended.

